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"There is a very considerable body of commercial law which is very
largely non-political in character, and which can be put into shape to
be flexibly permanent."
--Karl N. Llewellyn, circa 19401
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code is the greatest achievement
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Although the Code is a joint venture between the Confer-
ence and the American Law Institute, the Code idea originated
with the Conference, and the process used for its drafting and
enactment is in large part the Conference's uniform laws pro-
cess, modified somewhat to reflect the participation of the ALI.2
1. Memorandum from Karl N. Llewellyn to Executive Committee on
Scope and Program of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Section of Uniform Commercial Acts, Re: Possible Uniform Com-
mercial Code, (undated), reprinted in WML.u TwiNG, KARL LLEwELLYN AND
THE REALisT MovEmENT 524 app. E (1973).
2. ALI participation, of course, means that the ALI's members as well as
the Conference Commissioners consider and approve the Code. Further, the
drafting procedure developed for the Code followed "in outline" the procedure
developed by the ALI in its drafting of the restatements: draft preparation by a
reporter, review by a group of advisers, review by the Council of the ALI and
the appropriate section of the Conference, and ultimate presentation to the gen-
eral membership of the sponsoring organizations. Robert Braucher, The Legis-
lative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 800
(1958). The primary modification to the uniform laws process based on ALI
participation, however, was the creation of an editorial board to oversee the
original Code project. This editorial board, composed of the chief reporter and
two representatives each from the Conference and the ALI, evolved into the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter
PEB] at the end of the initial drafting of the Code. Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Arti-
cles 3,4, and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42 AlA. L. REv. 405,406 (1991).
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The Conference also has always had sole responsibility for ob-
taining enactment of the Code by the fifty state legislatures. 3
The Code is now in the midst of a period of modification and
redrafting unparalleled since the time of its original enactment,
and, once again, the Conference and its uniform laws process are
at center stage.4 Recently, however, the adequacy of the uni-
The PEB's responsibilities included the approval and promulgation of amend-
ments to the U.C.C.. Id. These are responsibilities that in the Conference's nor-
mal uniform laws process would be overseen by the Executive Committee and
President of the Conference, and carried out by a Special Committee appointed
to do the drafting. See infra text accompanying notes 22-28. Recently, how-
ever, the Code's sponsoring organizations have modified the PEB's responsibili-
ties in this regard so that Code drafts now are prepared through the
Conference's normal uniform laws process, rather than by the PEB or a commit-
tee formed by the PEB. Miller, supra, at 410 & n.10.
3. Miller, supra note 2, at 406.
4. Every original substantive Article of the Code is either being consid-
ered for revision, is in the process of revision, or has recently been revised. An
American Bar Association UCC Committee task force currently is studying the
revision of Article 1, General Provisions. Fred H. Miller, The UCC Today:Revi-
sions, Planned Revisions, and State Enactments, UCC BuLL., Jan. 1992, at 1, 1
[hereinafter UCC Today]. A drafting committee has been appointed to review
Article 2, Sales. Id. The estimated completion date for the committee's study is
1993, with promulgation of amendments in 1994 or 1995. Id. Revisions to Arti-
cle 3, Negotiable Instruments, and Article 4, Bank Deposits and Collections,
were promulgated in 1990. See Fred H. Miller, 1990 Articles 3 and 4: Looking
to the 21st Century, UCC BuLL., June 1991, at 1, 1. A drafting committee cur-
rently is drafting a revision of Article 5, Letters of Credit, with an estimated
completion date of 1993. UCC Today, supra, at 2. Revisions to Article 6, Bulk
Transfers, were promulgated in 1989, along with a recommendation that states
repeal that Article. Fred H. Miller, Repeal or Revision of Article 6-Bulk Trans-
fers, UCC BULL., Sept. 1991, at 1, 1. The UCC Committee of the ABA appointed
a task force in January, 1992 to consider revision of Article 7, Warehouse Re-
ceipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title. ABA Section of Business
Law, UCC Committee Update on the Activities and Focus of the Committee and
Its Subcommittees 13 (June 1993) [hereinafter Update]. The task force's final
report to the PEB is due in November of 1993. Id. A drafting committee cur-
rently is working on amendments to Article 8, Investment Securities. Update,
supra, at 13; UCC Today, supra, at 2. See James Steven Rogers, An Overview of
the Current Project to Revise Article 8, UCC BULL., May 1992, at 1, 1. A study
committee has recommended significant revisions to Article 9, Secured Trans-
actions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper, and the Conference has formed a
drafting committee, with completion of revisions expected in 1995 or 1996. Up-
date, supra, at 13; UCC Today, supra, at 2. In addition, the Conference and the
ALI have promulgated two entirely new Articles. Article 2A, promulgated in
1987 and amended in 1990, deals with personal property leases. Fred H.
Miller, UCC Article 2A and Its Uniform Amendments, UCC BULL., June 1991,
at 1, 1. In connection with the drafting of this Article, section 1-201(37) defin-
ing "security interest" was also amended. Id. A new Article 4A, dealing with
wholesale wire transfers was promulgated in 1989. Historical note, 2B U.L.
455 (1991). See Fred H. Miller, Article 4A: A Framework for Transmitting
Large Amounts of Funds, UCC BULL., July 1991, at 1, 1.
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form laws process as a means of promulgating commercial law
rules has been called into question. In particular, the insensi-
tivity to the interests of consumers of bank services reflected in
the 1990 revisions to Article 3, Negotiable Instruments, and Ar-
ticle 4, Bank Deposits and Collections, has raised concerns about
whether the uniform laws process is an adequate mechanism for
drafting legislation that affects consumer interests.5
This question is not a new one: the Conference always has
had problems with legislation that protects consumer interests.
The Conference rarely attempts to address consumer questions,
and in the few instances in which it has undertaken to draft con-
sumer-oriented legislation, its efforts have met with a poor re-
ception in state legislatures.
The question, however, is a particularly pressing one in this
time of renewed Code activity. Both the balance of federalism
and the face of politics have changed dramatically since the Con-
ference was established in 1892. In 1892, Congress had only
just begun to enter the field of economic regulation,6 and its
regulatory efforts were severely restricted by the Supreme
Court's narrow interpretations of the scope of Congress' pow-
ers;7 today, national economic regulation is the norm. In 1892, a
5. Both the Association of American Law Schools and the Business Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association have recently sponsored panel discussions
to explore this issue. See Tape of Program of Section on Commercial and Re-
lated Consumer Law, "The Impact of the Uniform Commissioners on Consumer
Law," Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, AALS 9101 Tape
50 (Jan. 7, 1992); Tape of Program of Section of Business Law, "The Twain
Shall Meet: Balancing Consumer Concerns and Business Interests Under the
UCC," Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association Spring Meet-
ing, ABA-239 (Apr. 11, 1992); see also, Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and
the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4,42 ALA. L. REV. 551 (1991) (discussing
politics of promulgating the Code). Professor Rubin explores the "basic
enigma" of "why a respected body of experts, supposedly operating outside the
political process, produced a statute that was less satisfactory on policy
grounds, than the [federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act], a statute produced
by our politically-immersed and much-maligned national legislature." Id. at
552.
6. Congress's first major attempts at modern regulatory legislation were
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890.
EDwARD L. BARmETr, JR., WiLLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTTru-
TIONAL LAw: CAsES AND MATERLus 188 (9th ed. 1993).
7. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (hold-
ing that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 could not be constitutionally ap-
plied to manufacturing combinations because manufacture was a local activity
reserved to the states). See generally, JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 4.5, at 143-45 (4th ed. 1991) (summarizing Supreme
Court's use of 10th Amendment to restrict federal power between 1888 and
1936).
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relatively small and homogeneous group held effective political
power in this country; today, although significant power dispari-
ties clearly still exist, political power has become sufficiently dis-
persed that policy makers often must accommodate a cacophony
of disparate interests in the course of legislating. Indeed, much
has changed since Llewellyn made the statement quoted at the
beginning of this Article-few legal scholars today would sug-
gest that commercial law, or any law, is nonpolitical.8
An evaluation of the efficacy of the uniform laws process as
a mechanism for drafting commercial law statutes in modem
times thus is, if anything, long overdue. It is time for the Con-
ference to undertake a systematic-and systemic-study of its
own processes in light of the nature of modem decision-making
and the role that the uniform laws process plays in the current
dynamics of federalism.
This Article is an attempt to assist the Conference in that
effort. The Article explores the relationship between the uni-
form laws process and the adequate representation of consumer
interests. It places the drafting and enactment of the Code, and
in particular, the drafting and enactment of Article 4, into the
context in which those events occurred-that is, the dynamics of
interest group politics and the dialectic of the state-federal rela-
tionship. Placing the uniform laws process as it has operated
with regard to the Code into this broader political context may
provide some insights into why that process consistently tends
to produce legislation favoring business interests over consumer
interests, and those insights in turn may point to ways in which
the process can be improved to correct that imbalance.9
The Article begins with a brief description of the Conference
and the uniform laws process. It then discusses the drafting and
enactment history of the Code, with particular emphasis on the
role that interest groups have played in that process. Next, the
8. Given Llewellyn's status as one of the leading realists, it seems surpris-
ing that he made this statement in 1940. For an interesting explanation of
Llewellyn's jurisprudential views regarding commercial law, see Richard
Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975).
9. Correcting this imbalance would not necessarily mean the Conference
would begin producing commercial legislation that favored consumers. The is-
sue is not one of pro-business versus pro-consumer legislation, but one of ade-
quate representation of all interests affected by uniform laws at the point those
laws are being drafted. The assumption is that if all interests were adequately
represented the resulting legislation would be more balanced in its approach,
reflecting neither inordinate favoritism of business interests nor of consumer
ones, but rather a reasonable compromise between the two.
1993]
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Article explores the amenability of the uniform laws process to
representation of business and consumer interests in light of
principles of interest group theory. The Article concludes that
application of these principles demonstrates that the uniform
laws process, as currently structured, is almost custom-made for
the drafting and enactment of pro-business legislation. Finally,
the Article discusses why the Conference should be particularly
concerned about the pro-business bias of the uniform laws pro-
cess and suggests ways in which the Conference might correct
some of the inadequacies of its approach.
II. THE CONFERENCE AND THE UNIFORM
LAWS PROCESS
The Conference is a national organization, consisting of
Commissioners from each of the fifty states, the District of Co-
lumbia and Puerto Rico.10 Although the Conference is some-
times identified as a "state organization,"" it is more
appropriately described as a private organization that has close
ties to both the states and the American Bar Association. It was
founded in 1892, largely through the efforts of the American Bar
Association, as a mechanism for obtaining uniformity of law
through voluntary state action.' 2 Commissioners generally are
appointed pursuant to enacting legislation in the states.' 3 The
Conference Constitution, however, allows the President of the
state bar association to appoint Commissioners whenever a
state does not have a mechanism for appointment or whenever
the designated state authority fails to act.' 4 Further, the
Conference Executive Committee may terminate the member-
ship of any Commissioner for failure to comply with Conference
requirements. 15 The Conference Constitution requires that all
Commissioners be members of a state bar and thus, that they
10. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 459 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 HANDBOOK].
11. See, e.g., id. at 460.
12. Allison Dunham, A History of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 233, 234, 236 (1965).
The Conference's current constitution states that its object is "to promote uni-
formity in the law among the several states on subjects where uniformity is
desirable and practicable." CONSTUTION & BYLAWS OF NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COM'!RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, art. 1, § 1.2 [hereinafter CONST. & BYLAws],
in 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 463.
13. CONST. & BYLAWS, supra note 12, art. 2, § 2.1.
14. Id.




The primary source of the Conference's funding is state ap-
propriations. 17 The Conference, however, also receives annual
contributions from the American Bar Association, and its major
uniform laws projects tend to be funded in large part by external
sources, such as foundations, interest groups, and, sometimes,
even federal agencies.' 8
Although Commissioners normally are appointed by the
states, by the Governor alone or in conjunction with the legisla-
ture,' 9 the Commissioners have no obligation to represent the
particular interests of their states. Indeed, the Commissioners'
allegiance is not to the states, but rather to the Conference.
Their obligation is to assist its efforts by encouraging state legis-
lation supporting the Conference 20 and fostering consideration
of uniform laws in their respective states.2 '
16. Id. § 2.4. The Conference also has non-voting associate members.
These members are directors or other administrative officers of state agencies,
such as state legislative reference bureaus, which are "charged by law with the
duty of drafting legislation at the request of the legislative or executive officers
of the state." Id. § 2.2. The bar requirement extends to these associate mem-
bers as well. Id. § 2.4.
17. 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 460.
18. Id. For instance, grants from the Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation
and subscriptions from various individuals, business, industrial, financial and
transportation concerns, and law firms funded the Uniform Commercial Code.
WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, JR., A CENTURY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 68
(1991); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MovEmENT 281
(1973). The United States Department of Transportation gave the Conference a
$100,000 contract for the Uniform Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. Id. at 101.
The Conference recently has established the Uniform Law Foundation to sup-
port its work, and begun a campaign to fund the Foundation in connection with
its 100th anniversary. See Helen Lucaitis, UCC Showing Its Age, Needs Revi-
sion, Cmc. DAILY LAW BULL., Jan. 16, 1992, at 1, 16.
19. 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 459. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 63,
para. 29.7 (Smith-Hurd 1989) (providing for appointment of nine Commission-
ers). The Illinois statute specifies that the Commissioner appointment will be
as follows: five by the governor, and one each by the president of the senate, the
senate minority leader, speaker of the house, and the house minority leader.
Id. The statute also provides for appointment of the executive director of the
Legislative Reference Bureau as an ex-officio member. Id.
20. The constitution requires that Commissioners, inter alia, seek passage
of state legislation providing for the appointment of Commissioners and pay-
ment of the Commissioners' expenses in attending annual meetings, and an an-
nual appropriation from their state legislature "toward defraying the expenses
of the Conference." CONST. & BYLAWs, supra note 12, art. 5, § 5.1(4) & (5).
21. 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 459; Statement of Policy Establish-
ing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and Consideration of Acts, § 7 (Au-
gust 2, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 Criteria] ("Approval of an act as a Uniform or
Model Act carries with it the obligation of the Commissioners from each state to
1993]
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Although anyone can make a proposal for a uniform law to
the Conference, 22 the Conference makes its own determination
as to the areas of law in which "uniformity is desirable and prac-
ticable" 23 and in which uniform legislation is thus appropriate.
Proposals for uniform acts are referred to the Conference's Com-
mittee on Scope and Program, which "makes an investigation,
sometimes hears interested parties, and reports... whether the
subject is one on which it is desirable and feasible to draft a uni-
form law."24 The final decision to draft an act is made by the
Conference Executive Committee.25
If the Executive Committee decides to draft an act, the Pres-
ident of the Conference assigns the subject to a Special Commit-
tee to prepare the draft. 26 A Review Committee, also appointed
by the President, reviews the Special Committee's draft to deter-
mine if its scope conforms to the Special Committee's assign-
ment.27 The Review Committee also considers and reports the
policy decisions made by the Special Committee to the Executive
Committee for ultimate presentation to the Conference, and de-
termines whether the draft is ready for submission to the Con-
ference.28 The entire Conference discusses and considers draft
acts section by section at no fewer than two annual meetings.29
Acts are promulgated by a vote of the state delegations. Each
delegation of Commissioners has one vote. An act must receive
the vote of a majority of the states represented at the annual
meeting and at least twenty jurisdictions.30
endeavor to procure consideration by the legislature of the state, unless the
Commissioners deem the act unsuitable or impracticable for enactment in their
state.").
22. See 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 460 (Conference receives propos-
als for uniform acts "from many sources").
23. CONST. & BYLAWs, supra note 12, art. 1, § 1.2.
24. 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 460; 1988 Criteria, supra note 21,
§ 6(a). The Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code per-
forms this function with regard to Code proposals. See supra note 2.
25. 1988 Criteria, supra note 21, § 6(b). The Permanent Editorial Board
performs this function with regard to the Code. See supra note 2.
26. 1986 HANDBOOI, supra note 10, at 460; CONST. & BYLAWS, supra note
12, art. 4, § 4.2; 1988 Criteria, supra note 21, § 6(b). Until recently, the Perma-
nent Editorial Board rather than the Conference had responsibility for drafting
committees with regard to the Code. Code drafting committees, however, now
proceed under the normal Conference procedures. See supra note 2.
27. 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 460; CONST. & BYLAws, supra note
12, art. 4, § 4.2; 1988 Criteria, supra note 21, § 6(b).
28. CONsT. & BYLAWs, supra note 12, art. 4, § 4.3; id. art. 29, §§ 29.1-29.3.
29. 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 461; CONST. AND BYLAws, supra note
12, art. 8, § 8.1.
30. Id.; id. § 8.3.
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Although drafting committees generally have adopted the
practice begun by the Code drafters of consulting extensively
with interested parties during the drafting process,3 1 the only
group the Conference procedures require drafting committees to
consult is the American Bar Association. 32 The Conference also
routinely submits uniform acts to the American Bar Association
for its approval,3 3 and the Conference President is required to
present an annual report to that organization and file copies of
Uniform Acts finally approved by the Conference with it. 34
Thus, the Conference is representative of the states only in
the sense that it draws its membership from them. The states
have no official control over its procedures or over the subject
matter of the laws it promulgates, and its members do not view
themselves as official representatives of their states' interests in
the process. Indeed, the primary defining characteristic of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
is that it is neither a democratically elected representative body,
nor one owing allegiance, or having any accountability, to any
political body.35
31. Dunham, supra note 12, at 245-46; 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at
461.
32. CONST. & BYLAWs, supra note 12, art. 31, § 31.1.
33. 1986 HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 461.
34. CONST. AND BYLAwS, supra note 12, art. 6, § 6.1.
35. Cf James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2096
(1991). White states:
Although the Commissioners are technically public officials, they are
an elite group. Most of the Commissioners are prominent lawyers not
chosen on the same basis used to choose a legislator, but chosen be-
cause they have a more intellectual interest in uniform law than would
a typical legislator. They are elected not by a vote of the electorate but
by the single vote of the governor. This mode of election doubtless
removes the Commissioners farther from the people than the typical
state legislator; it also produces a group that is much more sophisti-
cated in the law and more interested in long-range questions than they
would be if they had to stand for reelection every two or four years.
Id.
Commissioners do make reports to the governor or legislature of their
state. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 63, para. 29.7 (Smith-Hurd 1989) (requiring
that report be made to the governor); CoNsT. & BYLAws, supra note 12, art. 5,
§ 5.1(6) (mandating that copy of report filed with the governor or legislature of
the state be fied with the president of the Conference). These reports, however,
are informational and do not appear to have any effect on the continuation of
the Commissioners in their posts. The Conference Handbook, for example,
states that "[w]hile the usual term is three years, it is common practice for
governors to reappoint, without regard to their political affiliation, Commis-
sioners who have actively participated in the work of the Conference." 1986
HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 459. The Handbook goes on to state that "[tihe
organizational plan of the Conference makes its non-partisan nature self-evi-
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Conference supporters have pointed to this lack of political
accountability as one of the Conference's best features. Their
theory is that the lack of accountability insulates the laws the
Conference promulgates from political pressure. Uniform laws
are the product of a neutral group of experts, whose solutions
will represent the "best" way in which to regulate the particular
subject matter involved, rather than the product of political
compromise. 36
This lack of connection to a political body, however, also
means that the Conference has no ready ability to ensure that
the laws it promulgates are enacted. Not only does the Confer-
ence lack legislative power, but it also does not draft its laws as
the representative of a body that does. Even so, because its mis-
sion is to create uniformity among state laws, the Conference
and others tend to view states' passage of uniform laws as the
ultimate test of its success.37 Moreover, it must convince not
one state legislature to pass such laws, but fifty.
This focus on enactment, and the concomitant need to enlist
the support of others in order to have its laws enacted, has been
a powerful influence on the uniform laws promulgated by the
Conference, including the Uniform Commercial Code. As Pro-
fessor James J. White has stated, "[the] fundamental problem of
[an] elite legislature that lacks the power to cause its legislation
to be adopted [is] .... [w]hat legislation is appropriate"-that is,
"[w]hat legislation can be passed?" 38
At the same time, uniform laws lack the legitimacy that rep-
resentation gives to the decisions of a democratic body. Uniform
laws obtain their legitimacy, not from the political accountabil-
ity of those promulgating them, but from the supposed neutral-
dent. While the state Commissioners are obligated to endeavor to procure con-
sideration of uniform acts, they represent no special interest." Id.
36. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 12, at 244 (noting that Commissioners
"have not felt obligated to the law of their state, but rather have felt duty-
bound to seek the best solution"); ARMSTRONG, supra note 18, at 113 (quoting
speech of former Conference President George C. Keely). Keely stated that the
Conference is "unique" because of, inter alia, "the background, the knowledge,
the intellectual capacity, and the intellectual independence of its members;
[and] the absence of self-interest and most political pressures." Id.
37. See, e.g., White, supra note 35, at 2097. White states as follows:
If every uniform act proposed by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners were adopted by most of the fifty state legislatures, the Confer-
ence would be a legislature in every sense. If, on the other hand, few
such acts were ever adopted by more than a handful of legislatures, the





ity and expertise of these individuals. 3 9 As the drafting history
of the Code, and particularly that of Article 4, reveals, however,
these two consequences of the Conference's nonrepresentational
nature are not always easily harmonized. In fact, the realities of
interest group politics often make them opposing forces within
the uniform laws process.
III. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. AT THE BEGINNING
The Uniform Commercial Code was born at an interesting
time in the history of American federalism. Franklin Delano
Roosevelt was president; Congress was seeking national legisla-
tive solutions to a number of the nation's problems for the first
time; the regulatory state was struggling to be born.40 In 1937,
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Commerce Clause as a
broad grant of power to Congress in the commercial area and
beyond, which allowed Congress to regulate in areas formally
thought to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.4 1
On the other hand, in 1938, the Court struck down its 1842 deci-
sion in Swift v. Tyson,4 2 which had allowed federal courts to de-
velop their own commercial common law instead of following the
decisions of the state courts. 43 It was a period in which-at
39. Cf id. at 2097. White notes, "the principal argument that the Commis-
sioners can make on behalf of a uniform law when it is considered by a state
legislature is its technical and substantive superiority over a law born in the
back room of a state legislature and sired by a lobbying organization." Id.
40. See generally, JORDAN A. ScHwARz, THE NEW DATi RS: POWER POU-
Tics IN THE AGE OF ROOSEvELT (1993) (discussing the Roosevelt era).
41. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (uphold-
ing application of National Labor Relations Act to manufacturing activities).
The Court held that "[allthough activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to in-
terstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power
to exercise that control." Id. Accord, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941) (upholding application of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to manu-
facturing activities). In Darby, the Court held that the Commerce Clause power
extends to regulation of intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce and that are necessary and proper to regulate in order to
regulate interstate commerce. Id.
42. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938) (Story, J.).
43. In Swift, the holder of a bill of exchange brought an action against the
acceptor of the bill. Id. at 14. The issue was whether the holder had given
value for the bill when he had taken it in satisfaction of a pre-existing debt. Id.
at 15. The New York state courts had taken the position that satisfaction of a
pre-existing debt was not the giving of value. Id. at 15-17. The acceptor argued
1993]
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least with the benefit of hindsight-the political dialectic
through which the boundaries of state and federal power are
drawn was almost palpable.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the interplay of politics
and federalism has been a part of the history of the Code from
its inception. The impetus for developing the Code was the push
that the federal courts were bound to follow these decisions under section 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided, "that the laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." Id.
at 17. The Supreme Court, however, interpreted section 34 as applying only to:
state laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the
state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and
to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the
rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intra-
territorial in their nature and character.
Id. at 18. Section 34 thus left the federal courts free to develop their own com-
mon law rules with regard to matters governed by general legal principles, such
as "contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpre-
tation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribu-
nals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."
Id. at 19. Applying these general principles, the Court found that satisfaction
of a pre-existing debt did constitute value for purposes of negotiable instru-
ments law. Id.
The ability of the federal courts to create their own rules with regard to
matters governed by the general common law meant that, at least within the
federal court system, many commercial law matters achieved a degree of uni-
formity across state lines through the development of a federal commercial com-
mon law. ARmSTRONG, supra note 18, at 13; accord, JONATHAN D. VARAT,
Economic Integration and Interregional Migration in the United States Federal
System, in COMPA.ATIvE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM: EUROPE AND AMERICA 28
(Mark Tushnet ed., 1990). Indeed, uniformity of the law was what Justice
Story had intended:
Story envisioned the role of federal courts as putting an end to...
uncertainty. The concept of a universal general common law had much
appeal to those who wanted to rationalize and unify the law of com-
mercial transactions. All states should agree on the content of this
law, and the vehicle for unification would be the federal courts, acting
under one centralized supreme court.
LEA BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 204 (1986).
The Swift doctrine, however, had only limited potential as a mechanism for
obtaining uniformity of commercial law-not only did it not apply when a state
statute governed, but it did not bind the state courts, which declined to partici-
pate in Justice Story's unification plan, continuing instead to follow their own
independent and often conflicting interpretations of commercial law. Id.; see,
VARAT, supra, at 28. Because legal rules in state and federal court often dif-
fered, the Swift doctrine ultimately led to forum shopping and attempts to man-
ufacture diversity jurisdiction. BRILMAYER, supra, at 204-05. Swift was
overruled by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
The Swift doctrine nevertheless provided a means for firthering uniform-
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for enactment of a federal sales bill that would have preempted
the Conference's Uniform Sales Act.44 That federal bill had the
backing of the influential Merchants' Association of New York,
the endorsement of the American Bar Association, and the sup-
port of the distinguished commercial law expert, Karl N. Llewel-
lyn.45 Nevertheless, the Conference managed to seize the
initiative, lure away the federal sales bill's supporters, and not
only establish state law as the primary source of private com-
mercial law for the next forty years, but also develop that law
into a comprehensive code covering most aspects of commercial
transactions.
The federal sales bill was introduced in Congress in 1937,
where it attracted the interest of the Merchants' Association. 46
Although this bill initially followed the Conference's Uniform
Sales Act fairly closely, it was revised in light of changes sug-
gested by the Merchants' Association that departed significantly
from the Act.47 The same year, the American Bar Association
adopted a resolution urging its enactment, but the bill died in
ity of the commercial law at a time when the other branches of the national
government were not doing so, and was an important source of uniformity.
VARAT, supra, at 28. In fact, in areas where it applied, the reach of this com-
mercial federal common law exceeded the then-recognized scope of federal legis-
lative power. Id. Indeed, Professor Varat suggests there may be a causal
relationship between the expansion of Congress' Commerce Clause power and
the demise of Swift:
The timing of the Supreme Court's rejection of this haphazard notion
of federal general common law . . . was highly illuminating. The
Court's conclusion that the federal courts under the regime of Swift
had unconstitutionally usurped state lawmaking authority came just
as the Court began to back away from its restrictive interpretations of
the scope of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Discard-
ing a sporadic, largely ineffective judicial effort at economic integration
through uniform law surely had to be easier when comprehensive
power to effectively legislate uniform rules was being solidified.
Id. at 28-29.
44. TwINNG, supra note 18, at 277; E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of
Commercial Law and State-By-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradic-
tions, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 337, 340-41 (1978). The Uniform Sales Act was promul-
gated in 1906. Armstrong, supra note 18, at 165 app. E. It had been adopted in
34 states by 1941. Braucher, supra note 2, at 799.
45. TWINING, supra note 18, at 277-78.
46. Id. at 277. This was not the first time a federal sales bill had been
proposed. In 1922, the American Bar Association with the help of Professor
Samuel Williston, the primary drafter of the Conference's Uniform Sales Act,
produced a draft federal sales bill, which modified and added to the Uniform
Sales Act. Id. In response, the Conference amended the Uniform Sales Act,
and the federal bill fizzled. Id.; ARmSTRONG, supra note 18, at 40.
47. TWINNG, supra note 18, at 277.
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committee.48 The demise of the Swift doctrine in 1938, however,
motivated the Merchants' Association to continue its effort to get
a federal sales bill passed.49
Llewellyn supported the federal bill as the most efficient
way of bringing about needed reforms in the law of sales.50
Although Llewellyn believed that the Uniform Sales Act should
be amended, he argued that the uniform laws process did not
provide a workable alternative to federal legislation; he believed
it would lead to the same long process of piecemeal adoption by
the various states, and the consequent confusion and lack of uni-
formity, that had characterized the Conference's attempts to
have the initial Uniform Sales Act adopted.5 '
Llewellyn, who was a Commissioner from New York,
thought the Conference should work with those seeking a fed-
eral sales bill.52 He viewed the sales bill as an opportunity for
the states, through the mechanism of the Conference, to work in
consort with the national government to achieve reform. 53
Llewellyn persuaded Hiram Thomas, Chair of the Merchants'
Association, to work with the Conference on that basis, and
made a motion at the Conference annual meeting in 1937 that a
committee be set up to follow and cooperate in preparing a fed-
eral sales act.54 A majority of the Conference's Executive Com-
mittee, however, including the Conference President, William A.
Schnader, viewed the federal sales bill primarily as a threat to
the Uniform Sales Act rather than as a means of reforming the
48. Id.
49. ARMSTRONG, supra note 18, at 53.
50. TwING, supra note 18, at 278; see Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Fed-
eral Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 558 (1939-40) (noting "vital" need for Federal
Sales Act, particularly because of international ocean commerce needs, gaps in
coverage under the Uniform Sales Act, and need for uniformity).
51. Llewellyn, supra note 50, at 561. Llewellyn states as follows:
To prepare amendments to the Uniform Sales Act is possible, and is
desirable. But merely to set those amendments on the road to adop-
tion, State by State, is to throw new confusion into the field of inter-
state commerce. After thirty-four years, we still have one or another
variety of non-uniform "common" law in sixteen States; the picture
would, for another twenty or thirty years, be one of three varieties of
basic law, with sub-varieties inside each variety. The only practicable
road to real uniformity in interstate Sales transactions is by Congres-
sional action, subject to the courts of the United States for finther au-
thoritative development.
Id.
52. See TWINING, supra note 18, at 278.
53. Llewellyn, supra note 50, at 561; cf TwinNG, supra note 18, at 278
(stating Llewellyn saw Federal Sales Act as way to promote sales law reform).
54. TWINING, supra note 18, at 278.
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sales law.55 Schnader, a supporter of decentralized government,
also "was suspicious of moves which might increase the influ-
ence of Congress over commercial law."56 The Conference re-
jected Llewellyn's motion, resolving instead that the federal
sales bill should conform as closely as possible to the Uniform
Sales Act.57  Schnader, however, offered Llewellyn another
means for carrying out his reforms: the Conference appointed
Llewellyn chair of the Commercial Acts Section of the Confer-
ence, and Schnader indicated that Llewellyn could pursue plans
for reform of sales law through revision of the Uniform Sales
Act.58
Although the federal sales bill was reintroduced in 1939, it
was never enacted; the momentum for revision of the sales law
passed to the Conference after 1939. 59 Llewellyn had under-
taken revision of the Uniform Sales Act, with the Merchants' As-
sociation's Hiram Thomas as one of the six members of his
advisory committee.60 In 1940, Schnader proposed the develop-
ment of a comprehensive commercial code during his Presiden-
tial Address to the Conference on the occasion of its 50th annual
meeting.6 1 Llewellyn's revision of the Uniform Sales Act became
a pilot project for the drafting of this comprehensive commercial
code by the Conference, and Llewellyn became Chief Reporter





59. Id. (stating that the initiative for pursuing sales law reform shifted to
the Conference and to preparation of a revised Uniform Sales Act). Cf Taylor,
supra note 44, at 340-41 (stating congressional consideration of federal sales act
was delayed in light of conference project to revise Uniform Sales Act);
Braucher, supra note 2, at 799 (noting proponents of federal sales act were "in-
duced to postpone action" while Conference undertook revisions of Uniform
Sales Act).
60. Soia Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter: Soia Mentschikoff, 43 OmIo
ST. L.J. 537, 538-39 (1982).
61. TWINING, supra note 18, at 279; Braucher, supra note 2, at 799. Schna-
der may have seen the Code project in part as a way to revitalize the Confer-
ence. In discussing Schnader's proposal of the Code project, Professor Twining
notes that Schnader:
had become President of the [Conference] after a period of relative in-
activity by that body. He was one of a reform-minded group in the
organization who were anxious to make it more effectual. The record
of the [Conference] up to that time showed that the one area in which
there had been a relatively consistent demand for uniformity had been
commercial law.
TwINNG, supra note 18, at 279.
62. TWINING, supra note 18, at 278-285; Braucher, supra note 2, at 799-800.
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began with the formal agreement between the Conference and
the American Law Institute to work jointly in its drafting.63
B. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE CODE
One "cardinal policy" of the Conference and the ALI in
drafting the Code was to produce a law that most, if not all,
states would adopt.64 This guiding principle shaped both Code
process and Code substance in several ways. First, concerns
about the ultimate goal of enactment restricted the initial scope
of the Code. Most fields that could be expected to cause political
controversy were excluded or treated as severable.65 Second,
Llewellyn established a drafting process that encouraged input
from interested industries. Indeed, the Code was the first uni-
form laws project to make extensive use of consultation with in-
terested groups at the drafting stage.66 This consultation was
both formal, through advisory committees appointed to advise
the drafters of each article,67 and informal, through extensive
and ongoing contact between the drafters and representatives of
interests whose transactions would be governed by particular
articles of the Code. There seems little doubt that Llewellyn ap-
preciated the political efficacy of involving these business inter-
63. TwINNG, supra note 18, at 282.
64. Fairfax Leary, Jr. & Michael A. Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some
Good News from Articles Three and Four, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 613, 614 (1982).
65. TWINING, supra note 18, at 290. For instance, insurance, although a
logical subject for inclusion in a commercial code, was excluded from the Code
for political reasons. Id. at 330.
66. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An Experiment
in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A-B-.A J. 419, 419 (1950) (describing the Code
drafters' extensive consultation with interested groups as a "unique contribu-
tion to the methods of statutory drafting"). That feature subsequently was in-
corporated into the uniform laws process. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 12, at
245-46. Dunham describes the failure to involve interested groups at the draft-
ing stage as an early weakness in the uniform laws process, but notes that
"[slince the Uniform Commercial Code, where extensive use of advisory com-
mittees was made, the Conference has moved toward the appointment of expert
advisers for most of its major subjects." Id.
67. Six-member advisory committees, with the Conference and the ALI
each selecting three members, were set up as part of the basic agreement be-
tween the Conference and ALL. See TwING, supra note 18, at 282 (setting out
key provisions of the Treaty between the Conference and ALI). These advisory
committees were composed of "experts in the field of law concerned, experts in
the field of business or finance concerned, and also lawyers or judges of general
experience." Karl N. Llewellyn, Statement to the Law Revision Commission: A
Simple Case on Behalf of the Code, reprinted in TWINING, supra note 18, app. E
at 530. The use of formal advisers apparently was a feature adopted from the
ALI procedure for drafting its Restatements. See supra note 2.
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est groups in the drafting process;68 their involvement, however,
also reflected his basic beliefs about the nature of a commercial
code.
Llewellyn believed that the rules of commercial law were
best developed by looking at how situations actually were han-
dled in commercial practice.69 The primary purpose of a com-
mercial code was to facilitate economic activity, 70 and, in order
to do this, that code should reflect actual practice.' Moreover, the
code should be drafted in terms of business concepts so that it
would be intelligible to businessmen.71 The logical source for
determining actual practice and business concepts was those
who were engaged in commercial transactions.72
Thus, reporters for the various articles, some of whom were
68. See TwImNG, supra note 18, at 302-03. Twining states that Llewellyn's
activities with regard to the Code were carried out in the context of a clear
recognition that "if a code was to have a good chance of being enacted it would
have to satisfy three principal groups of people: the lawyers in the sponsoring
organizations, the more organized pressure groups outside the legislatures, and
the legislators themselves." Id.
69. Danzig, supra note 8, at 626.
70. TWINIWG, supra note 18, at 307.
71. Id. at 304.
72. Llewellyn also had a basic belief in the integrity of the business com-
munity-in their capacity "to act with good faith, decency and commercial rea-
sonableness." Id. at 310. This belief is reflected in the basic structure of the
Code itself. Section 1-102(2)(b) of the Code states that one purpose of the Code
is "to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties." U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1989). This provi-
sion reflects Llewellyn's recognition that a commercial code should be drafted
with the expectation that it will last without major legislative amendment for a
number of years, while, at the same time, business practices will constantly
evolve. TwnING, supra note 18, at 305.
Section 1-102(2)(b) also reflects Llewellyn's solution to this problem of flexi-
ble permanence, which was to employ flexible standards in the Code, such as
"commercial reasonableness" and "usage of the trade" that would allow courts
interpreting the Code to tie its provisions to changing business conditions. Id.
at 335-36. Such an approach is not only founded on "a faith in judges to make
honest, sensible commercially well-informed decisions once they have been
given some base-lines for judgment," but also on a "faith in the capacity of the
business community for satisfactory self-regulation within a framework of very
broadly drafted rules." Id. at 336.
Llewellyn's faith in the business community, however, was not blind. Al-
lison Dunham relates the following anecdote:
He [Llewellyn] would do this empirical research .... He sat in a bank
in New York in the foreign department for a couple weeks in order to
get a feel for the way banks did things. When he came out we all said
to him, "Well, what did you discover?" And he said, "I discovered the
only thing dumber than the domestic bank is the foreign bank."
Allison Dunham, Reflections of a Drafter: Allison Dunham, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
569, 569 (1982).
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non-experts on the subject matter of the articles they were as-
signed to draft,73 solicited informal contacts with the affected in-
dustries to find out how commercial transactions operated in the
field,74 and generally maintained these contacts throughout the
drafting process. 75 Indeed, Llewellyn stated that "[t]here was
constant correspondence and consultation with any outside ex-
perts in the business or law concerned who could be discovered
and who would give time." 76 Business interest groups, such as
the Association of American Railroads, The American Bankers'
Association, the National Canners Association, and the Ameri-
can Warehousemen's Association also were asked to comment on
the completed draft of the Code. 77
The solicitation of interest group participation not only pro-
vided the drafters with technical information and an under-
standing of business practices, but also created a mechanism for
the affected industries to access the drafting process and a ba-
rometer for the drafters to gauge how potential Code provisions
would be received by those industries. As a result of this inter-
action, the drafters made compromises within the subject mat-
ter covered by the Code "to eliminate opposition with strong
legislative clout."7 8 To the extent possible, these compromises
73. TWINING, supra note 18, at 284. Probably the most famous of these
"non-experts" was William Prosser, the torts guru, who was appointed as Re-
porter for Article 3, Negotiable Instruments. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 553
("Prosser was an acknowledged genius in the field of torts; with respect to com-
mercial law, however, he was pretty much at sea.").
74. TWHONG, supra note 18, at 286. For example, Professor Fairfax Leary,
Jr., gives the following description of the way in which he began the task of
drafting Article 4:
Well, what I felt reading through the bank collection material in the
literature was the need to know how the banks in fact operated. The
first thing I did was to go down to a large bank in Philadelphia that did
a lot of check collection work, and I said, "I'd like you to attach me to a
check and let me just go through the way you process it to see what
banks in fact do."
Fairfax Leary, Jr., Reflections of a Drafter: Fairfax Leary, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 557,
559 (1982). Llewellyn himself engaged in similar behavior:
After meetings of Code committees [Llewellyn] could be seen in the bar
cross-examining distinguished bankers or businessmen tenaciously
.... His questioning tended to be specific, guided principally by a
concern with function and process. "If I were a cheque and I arrived in
our bank where would I go? ... What would be done to me first? Why?"
TwnING, supra note 18, at 316.
75. See Twining, supra note 18, at 286.
76. Llewellyn, supra note 67, app. E at 534.
77. TWmING, supra note 18, at 286-87. Comments also were solicited from
other sources including bar associations, law firms, and official state commit-
tees. Id. at 287.
78. Leary & Schmitt, supra note 64, at 614.
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took the form of exclusions of certain subject matter from the
Code. For instance, the drafters excluded certificate of title pro-
visions from Article 9 because the National Association of Motor
Vehicle Commissioners threatened to block the Code if they
were included; in addition, car-trusts and insurance were ex-
empted from Article 9 coverage to pacify, respectively, the rail-
road interests and the insurance industry.79
Because exclusion was not always an option, however, some
policy choices were made in light of the concerns of an interest
that could block enactment. Thus, the drafters chose to deny
buyers of farm products the protection given to buyers in the
ordinary course of business in light of the need to "placat[e] the
Farm Credit Administration and the Grange."8 0 The decision to
promote the interests of secured over unsecured creditors re-
flected the belief that a code that did not provide for secured
credit could not be enacted.8 1 And the decision not to include
affirmative consumer protection provisions, such as disclosure
provisions in Article 9, was influenced by the belief that those
provisions might cause the Code to become "bogged down indefi-
nitely in a fight between consumer spokesman and finance com-
pany spokesman.., and the whole Code would be held up."8 2
C. ARTICLE FouR PAST
Banking interests were a crucial group in obtaining en-
actment of the Code. The Code's provisions touched banking in-
terests in a number of ways, and the banks powerful state lob-
bies clearly had the potential to make or break the Code.83
Thus, it is not surprising that Article 4, dealing with bank collec-
tions, "became the bloodiest battleground in the entire history of
the Code." 84 As Professor Fairfax Leary, Jr., the original re-
porter for Article 4, explained the situation: "[T]here's no way
you can have a Bank Collection Code and exempt banks. Hence
that part of the Code had to be drafted so as not to produce
79. Leary, supra note 74, at 557-58.
80. Leary & Schmitt, supra note 64, at 615.
81. Homer Kripke, Reflections of a Drafter: Homer Kripke, 42 Oio ST. L.J.
577, 578-79 (1982).
82. Id. at 582-83.
83. See Leary & Schmitt, supra note 64, at 615 ("[Ilt was clear that the
Code affected the banking industry in so many ways that without its concur-
rence passage of a Code in most legislatures would be improbable, perhaps even
impossible.").
84. Donald J. Rapson, Book Review, 41 Bus. LAw. 675, 677 (1986) (quoting
Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson (Oct. 8, 1980)).
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united opposition."8 5
The material covered by Article Four had never before been
the subject of a uniform law. Although a draft of a proposed
Uniform Bank Collections Law had been prepared, the Confer-
ence had never adopted it.86 The American Bankers' Associa-
tion, however, had drafted a model Bank Collection Code in an
effort to bring uniformity to the check collection process, and
that model code had been enacted in nineteen states.8 7 Leary's
draft of Article 4 departed significantly from the Bank Collection
Code and succeeded in evoking the united and adamant opposi-
tion of the banks.88 Negotiation with the banking interests en-
sued but was unsuccessful. 89 Leary left the project in 1950, and
in May 1951, the Conference and ALI voted to delete Article 4
from the Code "because on three or four issues, thought to be
crucial, it had proved impossible after years of negotiation to
reach a solution which was acceptable both to the sponsoring
organizations and to the group of bank counsel... which had
participated in the discussions." 90
The most important of these issues was the extent to which
Article 4's provisions would be subject to agreement otherwise.9 '
The banks argued that they needed to be able to contract out of
Article 4's provisions in order to allow the bank collection pro-
cess to change over time as conditions of collection changed.92
85. Leary, supra note 74, at 558.
86. Leary & Schmitt, supra note 64, at 617.
87. Rubin, supra note 5, at 553. For a summary of the state of the law with
regard to bank collections prior to Article 4, see Leary & Schmitt, supra note 64,
at 615-17.
88. Professor Edward Rubin gives the following description:
Article 4 had a storm[y] history. Leary produced a draft that repre-
sented a reconceptualization of the field, and thus a significant depar-
ture from the American Bankers Association's Bank Collection Code.
It reflected a thorough knowledge of the check collection process, and
combined a realistic recognition of industry needs with a rare sensitiv-
ity to consumer interests. But the New York Clearing House Associa-
tion reacted with fury, promptly informing Llewellyn that it would
oppose the passage of the entire U.C.C. if Article 4 remained.
Rubin, supra note 5, at 555 (citations omitted).
89. Id.
90. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor
Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364, 374 nn.22-23 (1952).
91. Id. at 374 n.23.
92. Id. at 375-76. Gilmore states:
The principal defense of Section 4-103 runs along these lines: Bank
collections is a highly technical field; the operation, because of the
enormous number of items handled by banks, must be routinized; as
conditions change, new operating procedures become necessary-it
would therefore be unwise to freeze any particular procedure by stat-
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Leary's original draft of Article 4 had restricted freedom of con-
tract, and although subsequent drafts contained fewer and
fewer restrictions on agreement otherwise,93 none of them pro-
vided sufficient freedom to satisfy the banks.
Despite the vote to drop Article 4, a group of bank counsel
headed by Walter Malcolm was given authorization to prepare
another draft of Article 4 over the summer of 1951.9 4 According
to Professor Grant Gilmore, who had taken over the Article 4
project after Leary left, Malcolm "understood that it was his
function to do whatever was necessary to placate the New York
group [of bank counsel]." 9 5 Not surprisingly, the draft that Mal-
colm's group produced resolved all the issues that had caused
the initial stand off in the way the banking representatives had
argued they should be resolved.96 This draft was approved at a
joint meeting of the Conference and ALI in September, 1951,
although no member of the Code drafting staff had participated
in its creation and although it "was presented to the joint meet-
ing with almost no opportunity for preliminary study by anyone
outside the banking group." 97
The influence of the bank lobby over the substance of Article
4 provoked the now-famous accusation by Professor Frederick K.
Beutel that "Article 4 on Bank Deposits and Collections is an
unfair piece of class legislation maneuvered through the Ameri-
can Law Institute and the Commission on Uniform Laws by
pressure groups favoring the bankers over their customers."98
According to Beutel, Article 4 was "a deliberate sell-out" by the
sponsoring organizations and had given the banks "a piece of
class legislation more favorable to their interests than the Amer-
ican Bankers Association Bank Collection Code which their
[own] lobby failed to put over on the legislatures." 99
ute; bankers are the only people with a sufficient understanding of the
technical processes to establish reasonable rules; it is absurd, fanciful
and professorial to imagine that banks would ever take undue advan-
tage of their customers.
Id. at 376.
93. See Leary & Schmitt, supra note 64, at 617-19 (discussing successive
drafts regarding freedom of contract).
94. Rapson, supra note 84, at 677 (quoting Gilmore letter).
95. Id.
96. Gilmore, supra note 90, at 374 n.23.
97. Id. at 374.
98. Frederick M. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code
Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YAIE L.J. 334, 335 (1952). Professor Rubin suggests
that Beutel's article "could be regarded as the first publication of the Critical
Legal Studies movement." Rubin, supra note 5, at 555.
99. Beutel, supra note 98, at 362-63.
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Perhaps more significantly, Gilmore, who was co-reporter
for Article 9 and, in general, an important defender of the Code,
agreed with Beutel.100 In his response to Beutel's article, he
stated that the drafting of Article 4 had involved "undue conces-
sions to special interest groups" and that "Article 4 as it now
reads should not be enacted, as part of the Code or in any other
guise."' 0 ' In private, Gilmore stated that the arrangement by
which bank counsel drafted the final version of Article 4 was
"tantamount to appointing a committee of dogs to draw up a
protective ordinance for cats." 10 2 Gilmore particularly objected
to the final resolution of the issue of the extent to which banks
would be allowed to contract out of Article 4, which he described
as "carrying a good joke too far," and which he suggested might
cause the courts to declare the Article unconstitutional "as an
100. Gilmore's comments seem particularly significant not only because he
was reporter for Article 4 in the period between Leary's departure and the deci-
sion to drop the Article, and thus intimately familiar with what was going on,
but also because of his status as a crucial member of the Code drafting team.
One can imagine that there would be a certain reticence on the part of those on
the drafting team of the Code to criticize its provisions lightly, much less to
make statements suggesting that one of its articles had been hijacked by a spe-
cial interest group. Indeed, Homer Kripke reported that he was eventually
called to task for criticizing Article 9:
Three of the early draftsmen, Gilmore, Coogan and Kripke, as they
rode the hustings and participated in lawyers' institutes to introduce
the Code in state after state, were somewhat free in pointing out that
Article 9 was less than perfect.... We persisted despite rumors that
we were making the political arm of the Code unhappy.
Then, at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting in Chicago
in 1963, General Schnader summoned Coogan and me to his hotel
room and told us that he wanted us to stop criticizing the Code. His
reason was that admissions by draftsmen that the Code was not yet
perfect and perhaps not yet finished made enactment difficult. We
asked him when we would be free to function as scholars and he an-
swered "1967," by which date he foresaw universal enactment except
in Louisiana.
Kripke, supra note 81, at 581-82.
101. Gilmore, supra note 90, at 377. Indeed, Gilmore seemed primarily con-
cerned with distancing the rest of the Code process from Article 4. Noting that
the drafters could easily sever Article 4 from the Code, he states the following:
Beutel does not suggest that the baleful influences which presided at
the final delivery of Article 4 operated over the rest of the Code. Nor
did they. The banks were principally concerned, as they had every
right to be, with Articles 4 on Bank Collections and 5 on Letters of
Credit. On the Letters of Credit Article a solution satisfactory to all
parties was eventually arrived at, of which even Beutel seems to ap-
prove. On no other part of the Code did there ever develop a situation
comparable to the Article 4 imbroglio or one which led to the making of
such undue concessions to special interest groups.
Id.
102. Rapson, supra note 84, at 677 (quoting Gilmore letter).
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improper delegation of legislative power to private interests." 0 3
Beutel and Gilmore, however, turned out to be voices crying
in the wilderness. The banks got their way: the bank counsel
version of Article 4 became the current Article 4 of the Code with
relatively few alterations, 10 4 was adopted as the law of all fifty
states, and reigned unchallenged in the area of bank collections
until passage of the federal Expedited Funds Availability Act of
1987.105
The story, however, has an epilogue, because the influence
of the bank interests over the fate of the Code was far from over.
The New York group that Malcolm had been assigned to placate
still had problems with the Code. 10 6 The Chase National Bank
and its in-house counsel, Emmett F. Smith, sought to block pas-
sage of the Code in Pennsylvania, the first state to bring the
Code to a vote. 10 7 When unsuccessful in that endeavor, they
persuaded the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
and the New York State Bar Association to issue a joint report
recommending that the Code be referred to the New York Law
Revision Commission for a full-scale study.'08
103. Gilmore, supra note 90, at 375-76.
104. Rubin, supra note 5, at 555.
105. Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 601-613, 101 Stat. 552, 635-52 (1987) (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988)). See Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation
and the Federalization of State Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System,
49 Onto ST. L.J. 1251, 1251 (1989) (stating rules governing checking system
remained matter of state law despite extensive federal regulation of other as-
pects of financial service industry until Expedited Funds Availability Act).
106. See Rapson, supra note 84, at 677 (quoting Gilmore letter which states
the New York group "refused to be placated").
107. TWINING, supra note 18, at 290.
108. Id. at 293. Professor Braucher gives the following description of Mr.
Smith's efforts on behalf of Chase:
Late in 1952 [Smith] began a one-man campaign to defeat the Code,
circulating far and wide over the nation two mimeographed memo-
randa of forty-odd pages each. Far more effective than the Beutel at-
tacks [in the Yale Law Journal], the Smith memoranda provoked a
printed reply from the Conference. Opposition by other groups seems
to be traceable at least in part to the Smith memoranda, and it seems a
fair guess that Smith was largely responsible for the fact that no state
except Pennsylvania enacted the Code before 1957.
Braucher, supra note 2, at 802 (footnotes omitted). One of these groups was the
American Bankers Association, which issued a report in 1954 that was critical
of the Code. Id. at 802 & n.29. This report led the Indiana Bankers Association
to block passage of the Code in Indiana in 1957. Id. at 804. See also HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 137
(Lord Baltimore Press 1953) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (stating that Smith's
memoranda "undoubtedly did damage in Indiana and elsewhere."). The HAND-
BOOK notes that Chase opposed the Code "notwithstanding the fact that the
Chase National Bank was the highest bank contributor to the project and cer-
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The Code was referred in 1953 to the New York Law Revi-
sion Commission, which issued its report almost three years
later, after conducting hearings, considering the reports of con-
sultants, and producing very detailed studies of each of the arti-
cles.' 0 9 During the New York study a moratorium was called on
further attempts to enact the Code. 110 The study concluded that
New York should not adopt the Code without extensive revision,
a conclusion that "had a pronounced chilling effect upon efforts
for its acceptance in other states.""' A new version of the Code
adopting most of the Commission's recommendations was pro-
duced nine months after the Commission's report was issued."
2
New York's final adoption of the Code in September 1962 consti-
tuted the "great breakthrough" that assured the Code would be-
come successful. 113
D. ARTICLE FouR PRESENT
With the recent revision of Article 4 and its companion Arti-
tainly approved the idea when the Code was first proposed and when the money
was raised to finance it." Id.
109. TWINING, supra note 18, at 293. It appears that Chases primary objec-
tion to the Code during these hearings was the definition of good faith con-
tained in section 3-302. Braucher, supra note 2, at 813 (noting that this
provision "was perhaps the item most vigorously discussed in the New York
hearings"). As originally drafted, Section 3-302 included in the definition of
good faith "the observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any busi-
ness in which the holder may be engaged." Id.
Chase opposed this provision on the grounds that it established an objec-
tive standard for good faith. Id. In response to this objection, the U.C.C. edito-
rial board deleted the reference to "observance of reasonable commercial
standards." Id. This deletion left the definition of "good faith" to the Code's
general definition of that term, which contains a subjective standard. Id.;
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1989) (defining "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the con-
duct or transaction concerned"). See id. § 3-302(1)(b).
The revisions to Article 3 adopt an objective standard for good faith. Sec-
tion 3-103(a)(4) states that" '[glood faith' means honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4)
(1990). That standard, however, is not the same as the one to which Chase
objected, for it relates not to the applicable standard of care, but rather to the
"commercial decency" of the transaction. Cf Braucher, supra note 2, at 813
(explaining definition of good faith with regard to similar "fair dealing" lan-
guage contained in section 2-103(1)(b)).
110. TwING, supra note 18, at 293-94.
111. ARMSTRONG, supra note 18, at 77. The Report stated that the Uniform
Commercial Code "is not satisfactory in its present form, and cannot be made
satisfactory without comprehensive re-examination and revision in the light of
all critical comment obtainable." STATE OF NEW YORK LAw REVISION COMmS-
SION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 68 (1956).
112. TWING, supra note 18, at 296.
113. Id. at 298.
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cle 3, dealing with negotiable instruments, history seems in
large part to have repeated itself. The original project to revise
Articles 3 and 4 began in 1974 as part of a larger project to re-
vise Articles 3, 4 and 8.114 The purpose of the project was to
reflect changes in ways of doing business in the banking and se-
curities industries since those Articles were promulgated, in-
cluding the increasing use of electronic systems. 115 The Article
8 drafting committee completed its work fairly quickly; the Con-
ference and the ALI approved the amendments to Article 8 in
1977 and included them in the 1978 official text of the Code. 116
The revisions to Articles 3 and 4 took a more tortuous route.
The sponsoring organizations did not finally promulgate those
revisions until 1990.
Professor Hal Scott was appointed Reporter for the revi-
sions and, like his predecessors, he began his effort by gathering
"empirical evidence from bankers and bank counsel concerning
the operation and problems of payment systems."' 1 7 Based on
this information, he produced a study report setting out pro-
posed changes." i8 The banking industry considered this report
at a two-day invitational conference in Williamsburg, Virginia in
April 1978.119 After that Conference, the U.C.C. Permanent
Editorial Board instructed the drafting committee to draft
proposed amendments.' 20 Instead of drafting piecemeal amend-
ments to Articles 3 and 4, the committee prepared a draft that
set forth rules for all payment mechanisms other than cash-
checks, credit cards, and electronic fund transfers.' 2i This effort
to provide a unified set of rules for the payment system, as Arti-
cle 9 before it had unified the rules for the various forms of se-
curity instruments, came to be known as the New Payments
Code ("NPC").122
In addition to its reorganization of the law relating to pay-
ment systems, the NPC contained a number of consumer protec-
tion provisions. As a practical matter, consumer protection was
required in any comprehensive code seeking to apply the same
114. Miller, supra note 2, at 406-07.
115. Id.




120. Miller, supra note 2, at 407.
121. Miller, supra note 2, at 407-08; Rubin, supra note 5, at 557.
122. Rubin, supra note 5, at 557.
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rules to all payment systems because both credit cards123 and
consumer electronic fund transfers 24 were already subject to
federal legislation containing extensive consumer protection
provisions. 125 Thus, the NPC included the following consumer
protection provisions: "(1) limitations on the ability to vary the
effect of NPC provisions by agreement; (2) limitation of due
course rights; (3) full consequential damages for wrongful dis-
honor or debit; (4) limited liability for unauthorized orders
under $500; (5) an error resolution procedure; (6) a right of re-
versibility; and (7) disclosure requirements."126
The NPC, however, pleased no one. Banking interests
objected to a unitary payment systems code, "[plerceiving that
the effort to meld check, credit card, and electronic funds trans-
fer law would impose some of the consumer protection features
of the federal legislation on the checking system."127 Represen-
tatives of consumer interests were concerned that the Code
"seemed to dilute existing protection afforded for credit
cards." 128 Banking interests and others also feared that they
were not being given adequate participation in the formulation
of the policy choices reflected by the NPC. 129 Although the
drafts were submitted to interested groups for comment, the ac-
tual meetings of the drafting committee were only attended by
committee members and representatives of the Conference and
the ALI.130 The industry interest groups apparently became
suspicious that the drafting committee was not considering their
comments because substantive provisions that they "perceived
as extreme" were nevertheless "continued in future drafts
notwithstanding [their] adverse comments. " 131
In an attempt to alleviate the concerns of the banking inter-
123. See Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1988).
For a discussion of this legislation, see John C. Weistart, Consumer Protection
in the Credit Card Industry: Federal Legislative Controls, 70 MicH. L. REv. 1476
(1972).
124. See Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693-1693r (1988);
Rubin, supra note 5, at 579-86 (comparing provisions of EFTA to provisions of
revised Articles 3 and 4).
125. Cf Miller, supra note 2, at 409 & n.6. (stating that consumer protection
provisions were product of compromise necessitated by fact some payments sys-
tems had extensive consumer protection provisions while the check system did
not).
126. Id.
127. Rubin, supra note 5, at 557-58.
128. Id.; see Miller, supra note 2, at 408-09.
129. Miller, supra note 2, at 408.
130. Id. at 408 n.5.
131. Id. at 408 & n.5.
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ests, the Permanent Editorial Board for the U.C.C. sponsored
another invitational conference for the bankers in Williamsburg
in 1983, at which the New York Clearing House led a strong
bank protest against "the proposition that Articles 3 and 4
should be cast aside in favor of a comprehensive payments code
covering all payments systems." 13 2 As a result of this con-
ference, the consumer protection provisions were dropped from
the NPC. Professor Fred H. Miller, now Director of the Confer-
ence, explains:
It is sometimes true that a statute no one likes is a good one, and that
may have been true of the NPC, but such a statute also is not one that
is likely to be enacted. Thus, in an attempt to address the concerns
and reservations expressed, a decision was made by the [drafting]
Committee to remove the affirmative consumer protection provisions
that had been included in the NPC. These provisions necessarily were
a result of compromise and pleased no one on either side of the issue.
The result of this decision was to leave consumer protection issues to
other law and return the NPC to the traditional posture of the
U.C.C.
1 3 3
Neither the sacrifice of the consumer protection provisions,
nor a structural reorganization of the NPC, however, proved suf-
ficient to save it.134 The NPC and its Reporter suffered the fate
of Professor Leary and his version of Article 4. The Conference
and ALI terminated the NPC project in 1985 and created two
new projects: a revision of Articles 3 and 4 with "the more mod-
est goal of cleaning up conflicting interpretations and incorpo-
rating desirable substantive improvements to take account of
technological developments and changes in business practices"
and a project to draft a new Article 4A to govern wholesale wire
transfers.' 3 5 Professors Robert L. Jordan and William D. War-
ren became the reporters for these projects. 13 6
Despite these actions, "leaders in the banking industry
seemed unconvinced that the Conference really intended to
make a fresh start," and, thus, a third meeting was held in Alex-
andria, Virginia at the suggestion of the Executive Director of
the Conference so that "leading bankers [could] ...air their
views." 13 7 At the end of this three day meeting, the official his-
tory of the Conference states that "confidence in the processes of
132. AR smONG, supra note 18, at 121; Miller, supra note 2, at 408.
133. Miller, supra note 2, at 408-09 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 409.
135. Id. at 409-10.
136. Robert L. Jordan & William D. Warren, Introduction, 42 ALA. L. Rav.
373, 373 (1991).
137. AMISTRONG, supra note 18, at 121.
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the Conference had been restored."138
Thus, as with the original Article 4, banking interests once
again got their way. Professor Edward L. Rubin, who was in-
volved in these events as Chair of the Subcommittee on Articles
3 and 4 of the American Bar Association Ad Hoc Committee on
Payment Systems, 13 9 states that "[t]he sponsors agreed that the
balance between banks and consumers in Articles 3 and 4-the
balance that Beutel attacked as class legislation and Gilmore
said he did not have the heart to defend-would not be
changed."' 40 In fact, the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 that
emerged from the drafting process do change that balance-the
revised Articles 3 and 4 are even more pro-bank than were their
predecessors. Not only do they lack "affirmative" consumer pro-
tection provisions, like disclosure requirements and bank serv-
ices pricing controls, but in the course of resolving the
conflicting interpretations of certain provisions, the interpreta-
tion favorable to the banks is almost always chosen, and, in the
course of accommodating the Code to technological advances in
the bank collection process, little regard is given to the impact of
this accommodation on bank customers.
A detailed analysis of the impact of the revisions to Articles
3 and 4 on consumers is beyond the scope of this Article. 141 The
following discussion of unauthorized signatures and the bank's
duty of care, however, gives a flavor of the policy choices made in
the revisions. It also provides a certain symmetry to this discus-
sion of the drafting history of Article 4, as it relates to the banks'
ability to alter the provisions of Article 4, the issue banks consid-
ered so crucial when they blocked the original Article 4.
E. UNAUTHORIZED SIGNATURES AND THE BANKs DUTY OF
CARE
The banks' ability to alter the provisions of Article 4 was
embodied in section 4-103, which allowed the provisions of the
Article to be varied by agreement, with the proviso that a bank
could not disclaim responsibility for its lack of good faith or fail-
138. Id.
139. Rubin, supra note 5, at 551.
140. Id. at 558.
141. For two excellent discussions of this issue, see Gail K. Hillebrand, Re-
vised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Consumer Perspec-
tive, 42 AL. L. REv. 679 (1991) (giving a section by section analysis of the
impact of the revisions on consumers); Rubin, supra note 5 (analyzing the policy
choices with regard to consumers made in the Article 3 and 4 revisions in terms
of social policies of efficiency and equity).
110 [Vol. 78:83
UNIFORM LAWS PROCESS
ure to exercise ordinary care, or limit the resulting damages.' 42
Such an agreement is binding on all parties with an interest in
the item, even if they are not parties to the agreement, or are
not even aware of it. 14 3 Section 4-103 further provides:
[aiction or non-action approved by this Article or pursuant to Federal
Reserve regulations or operating letters constitutes the exercise of or-
dinary care and, in the absence of special instructions, action or non-
action consistent with clearing house rules and the like or with a gen-
eral banking usage not disapproved by this Article, prima facie consti-
tutes the exercise of ordinary care.
14 4
Comment 4 to section 4-103 indicates that "general banking us-
age" means "a general usage common to banks in the area con-
cerned." 14 5 General banking usage is only prima facie evidence
of ordinary care, in recognition of the fact banks may not be
under outside control of regulatory authorities with regard to
these practices and, thus, "the courts [have] the ultimate power
to determine ordinary care in any case where it should appear
desirable to do so."' 46 The Comment concludes by stating that
"[t]he prima facie rule does, however, impose on the party con-
testing the standards to establish that they are unreasonable,
arbitrary or unfair. " ' 4 7
Because Gilmore read section 4-103 as giving banks the
power to define ordinary care for themselves, he described its
policy (with the pun no doubt intended) as that of "writ[ing] a
blank check to the order of [a] private interest group."' 48 As
discussed above, he thought the courts might declare this sec-
tion unconstitutional; even if they did not, he believed there
were sufficient potential loopholes in its language to allow the
courts to impose limits on the scope of the permitted variation
by agreement.14 9
After enactment of the Code, a split of authority arose in the
courts over whether certain "banking usages" constituted ordi-
nary care in the context of the bank's liability to its customer for
paying an unauthorized or forged check. One of the most an-
cient and fundamental duties imposed in the negotiable instru-
ments law is the duty of the entity upon which a check is drawn
142. u.c.c. § 4-103(1) (1989).
143. See id. § 4-103(2).
144. Id. § 4-103(3).
145. Id. § 4-103 cmt. 4. See also U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1989) (defining "usage of
trade").
146. U.C.C. § 4-103 cmt. 4 (1989).
147. Id.
148. Gilmore, supra note 90, at 376.
149. Id. at 375-76.
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to know its drawer's signature.150 One implication of this duty
is that a bank may charge its customer's account only for items
that are authorized. 151 Thus, in general, a bank must recredit
its customer's account if it pays a check drawn on that account
that does not bear the customer's authorized signature. Negli-
gence on the part of the customer, however, can alter this basic
rule of bank liability for unauthorized checks. Under section 4-
406, if the customer fails to check her statement and report any
unauthorized signatures promptly to the bank, she will be es-
topped from having her account recredited with regard to cer-
tain of the improperly paid checks if the bank has exercised
ordinary care in its payment of the checks. 152 If the bank has
not exercised ordinary care in paying, then the estoppel does not
apply, and the bank is still liable. 15 3
With the advent of computerized processing based on the
150. See Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762) (Mansfield,
L.J.); U.C.C. § 3-418 cmt. 1 (1989).
151. This obligation is more implied from, than stated in, section 4-401(1)
which reads as follows: "As against its customer, a bank may charge against
his account any item which is otherwise properly payable from that account
even though the charge creates an overdraft." U.C.C. § 4-401(1) (1989). Be-
cause an unauthorized signature is "wholly inoperative as that of the person
whose name is signed," id. § 3-404(1), a check bearing an unauthorized signa-
ture is not properly payable under section 4-401. Id. § 3-404(1). The revised
section 4-401(a) makes the duty explicit. Section 4-401(a) provides the
following:
A bank may charge against the account of a customer an item that is
properly payable from the account even though the charge creates an
overdraft. An item is properly payable if it is authorized by the cus-
tomer and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer
and bank.
U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (1990).
152. U.C.C. § 4-406(1)-(3) (1989). The preclusion applies with regard to all
unauthorized checks by the same wrongdoer paid by the bank "after the first
item and statement was available to the customer for a reasonable period not
exceeding fourteen calendar days" and before the customer notified the bank.
Id. § 4-406(2)(b). The preclusion also applies to the first unauthorized item if
the bank "also establishes that it suffered a loss by reason of such failure." Id.
§ 4-406(2)(a). Section 4-406, both in its original and revised form, also covers
material alterations. Id. § 4-406(1); U.C.C. § 4-406(c) (1990). This discussion of
that section, however, is limited to its treatment of unauthorized signatures.
153. U.C.C. § 4-406(3) (1989). Section 4-406 thus established a contributory
negligence standard with regard to bank negligence. The revisions have altered
Section 4-406 to create a comparative negligence standard. U.C.C. § 4-406(e)
(1990). This alteration represents another choice of bank over customer. See
Rubin, supra note 5, at 569-70 (discussing way in which comparative negligence
standard reduces likelihood that customer will bring suit against the bank).
The revisions also add the requirement that the customer establish that the
bank's lack of ordinary care in paying the check "substantially contributed to
[the] loss." U.C.C. § 4-406(e) (1990). See Hillebrand, supra note 141, at 688-89
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Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) line printed on
checks, developed by the banks to deal with the ever-increasing
volume of checks, many banks stopped examining the cus-
tomer's signature on all checks. It became a common practice
among many banks to program their computer to kick out only
checks over a certain amount for actual human inspection and to
pay all other checks-the vast majority-without signature in-
spection.154 Presumably, the amount selected reflected the
bank's assessment of the point at which the potential costs to
the bank from improper payment outweighed the savings in effi-
ciency from computer processing.' 55 Nevertheless, in cases in
which customers sought to have their accounts recredited for im-
proper payment, and in which the bank made an assertion of
customer negligence through lack of prompt reporting under
section 4-406, banks argued that their own failure to check their
customer's signature did not constitute a lack of ordinary care
on their part. Indeed, they argued that the failure to check sig-
natures on all checks was a general banking usage because most
banks did not do so, and, thus, that this failure was in fact a
prima facie exercise of ordinary care.156
Courts split on this issue. Some, focusing on the language
of section 4-103, and the policy of flexibility in order to accommo-
date technological change that underlies it, 15 7 agreed with the
banks and placed on the customer the burden of showing that
this practice was arbitrary or unfair. 158 Others, emphasizing
(discussing "substantially contributed" requirement and comparative negli-
gence standard).
154. See, e.g., Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 552
N.E.2d 783, 785 (111. 1990) (stating bank did not inspect checks under $1,000, or
approximately 93% of total checks processed); Medford Irrigation Dist. v. West-
ern Bank, 676 P.2d 329, 331 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (no inspection of checks under
$5,000).
155. See, e.g., Medford, 676 P.2d at 332 (explaining that bank adopted policy
of not reviewing checks below $5,000 after concluding that cost of reviewing
checks for unauthorized signatures greatly exceeded benefits).
156. E.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d
291, 294 (1st Cir. 1988); Wilder Binding, 552 N.E.2d at 786.
157. See U.C.C. § 4-103, cmt. 1 (1989). The comment states as follows:
In view of the technical complexity of the field of bank collections, the
enormous number of items handled by banks, the certainty that there
will be variations from the normal in each day's work in each bank, the
certainty of changing conditions and the possibility of developing im-
proved methods of collection to speed the process, it would be unwise to
freeze present methods of operation by mandatory statutory rules.
Id.
158. E.g., Wilder Binding, 552 N.E.2d at 786 (holding evidence that auto-
matic payment of checks under $1,000 was consistent with general banking us-
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the bank's statutory duty not to pay unauthorized checks, found
that the failure to provide any procedure for the examination of
checks below a set amount constituted a lack of ordinary care on
the part of the bank as a matter of law.159 Still other courts
upheld procedures that did not involve sight verification of all
items below a certain dollar amount but did involve random re-
view of some of these items, although these courts suggested
that they might decide otherwise if no verification procedure
had been provided.160
The Revisions explicitly address this issue. Section 3-
103(a)(7), defining "ordinary care" for purposes of revised Arti-
cles 3 and 4, provides a special rule regarding the bank's duty to
examine checks processed for collection by automated means. 1 1
After defining "ordinary care" as "observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards, prevailing in the area in which [a] person is
located, with respect to the business in which the person is en-
gaged," section 3-103 states as follows:
[i]n the case of a bank that takes an instrument for processing for col-
lection or payment by automated means, reasonable commercial stan-
dards do not require the bank to examine the instrument if the failure
to examine does not violate the" bank's prescribed procedures and the
bank's procedures do not vary unreasonably from general banking us-
age created a genuine issue of material fact regarding ordinary care making
summary judgment improper); cf. Vending Chattanooga, Inc. v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 730 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Tenn. 1987) (forged checks paid over
the counter without close comparison to signature card) (where bank followed
customary banking practices, burden is on plaintiff to show methods of banking
industry are "so careless as to show the lack of ordinary care on all banks").
159. E.g., Medford, 676 P.2d at 332 (ruling that bank must adopt procedure
that reasonably meets its responsibility to use ordinary care in paying only
checks with authorized signatures). The Medford court held that the practice of
automatically paying checks below a certain dollar amount, while it "may be a
prudent business decision and followed by most banks,.., does not meet the
banlks responsibility under the statutes" as a matter of law. Id. Cf. Hanover
Ins. Co. v. Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1979) (alteration
of payee's name). In Hanover, the court held that, "no matter what minimal
standards are suggested by local banking usage [such usage] cannot amend the
statutory requirement of ordinary care." Id. at 506.
160. E.g., Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d at 294. In Zapata, the court found that
banking usage involving sight examination of checks over $1000, checks with
which there was some reason to suspect a problem, and a randomly chosen one
percent of checks between $100 and $1,000 constituted ordinary care. Id. The
court distinguished contrary authority as involving "practices more obviously
unreasonable than those presented here." Id. Cf Medford, 676 P.2d at 332
(stating that bank need not adopt a particular procedure such as sight review in
order to comply with its statutory duty, but procedure must reasonably relate to
the detection of unauthorized signatures).
161. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(7) cmt. 5 (1990).
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age not disapproved by this Article or Article 4.162
Talk about writing a blank check for an interest group! This
definition of "ordinary care" apparently does not even require
the bank to establish that the procedure it followed constituted a
"general banking usage." All section 3-103 seems to require is
that a bank follow its own normal procedure and that the proce-
dure "not vary unreasonably" from what other banks in that
area do. 163 Clearly there is little left under this standard of the
bank's obligation to provide a procedure to ensure that it pays
only authorized checks. 164 Instead, the Code, in effect, shifts the
162. Id. § 3-103(a)(7).
163. The comments, however, seem to suggest otherwise. Comment 4 to re-
vised section 4-406 states that section 3-103(aX7) means that "sight examina-
tion by a payor bank is not required if its procedure is reasonable and is
commonly followed by other comparable banks in the area." Id. § 4-406 cmt. 4
(emphasis added). This is not, however, what the language of section 3-
103(a)(7) actually provides.
164. Comment 5 to section 3-103 does state: "[niothing in Section 3-103(a)(7)
is intended to prevent a customer from proving that the procedures followed by
a bank are unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair." Id. § 3-103 cmt. 5. Addition-
ally, revised section 4-103 still provides that "a general banking usage" is only
prima facie evidence of the exercise of ordinary care. Id. § 4-103(c). Further,
the comments to section 4-103 still provide that the prima facie rule means that
"the party contesting the standards" has the burden "to establish that they are
unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair." § 4-103 cmt 4. The comment, however, may
clarify this burden somewhat by adding "as used by the particular bank." Id.
Nevertheless, these statements seem difficult to reconcile with section 3-
103(a)(7) itself. If as section 3-103(a)(1) seems to state, a procedure that does
not "vary unreasonably" from a general banking usage satisfies the reasonable
commercial standards requirement and thus is ordinary care, then it makes
little sense to say that the general banking usage from which it varies is only
"prima facie" evidence of ordinary care. It also seems unclear how a customer
could establish that a bank's compliance with a procedure that constitutes ordi-
nary care under the Code's express definition of that term could nevertheless be
"unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair" short of establishing that section 3-
103(a)(7) is itself those things. Indeed, although the comments clearly indicate
that the drafters did not intend this, a procedure that complies with section 3-
103(a)(7) arguably constitutes "[a]ction or non-action" approved by Article 4,
and thus is not even subject to the prima facie rule. See id. § 4-103(c) ("Action
or non-action approved by this Article... is the exercise of ordinary care. .. ").
Professors White and Summers have noted that the Code comments some-
times depart from the actual text in an attempt to restrict or narrow its mean-
ing. JAMEs J. WHIT & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNnFoRm COMiMERCIAL CODE § 4,
at 13 (3d ed. 1988). They also suggest that the explanation for this is "partly
political" in that "[w]hen opponents of a draft section prevailed against the
draftsman, the draftsman would sometimes revise the draft accordingly, but
seek to preserve the old draft in the comments." Id. Although one can only
speculate about whether this is the reason for the disparity between section 3-
103(a)(7) and its applicable comments, it seems clear that a distinct tension
between them exists.
One wonders if by analogy to section 3-103(a)(7), a customer could argue
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burden of compliance with the bank's duty from the bank to its
customers; they must either promptly discover and report unau-
thorized checks to the bank or be precluded from recovering for
improper debits to their account under section 4-406, even
though the bank paid the checks without any review. 165 Instead
of banks absorbing losses caused by their failure to verify signa-
tures as a cost of doing business, those losses now are borne by
individual customers who fail to detect unauthorized signatures
with the requisite degree of promptness.
The comments give little explanation of why the sponsoring
organizations made this important policy choice. Comment 4 to
section 4-406 states the following:
The effect of the definition of "ordinary care" on Section 4-406 is only to
provide that in the small percentage of cases in which a customer's
failure to examine its statement or returned items has led to loss ... a
bank should not have to share that loss solely because it has adopted
an automated collection or payment procedure in order to deal with the
great volume of items at a lower cost to all customers.
16 6
This comment suggests, first, that only a "small percentage of
cases" come under section 4-406 and thus will be affected by this
definition of ordinary care. The fact that a provision will impact
only a limited number of individuals, however, hardly seems a
persuasive explanation of why it should exist.
In addition, the comment seems to suggest that this defini-
that she was not negligent in failing to examine her bank statement within the
thirty days that the revised section 4-406 seem to provide for examination, if
she could establish that her failure to do so did not "vary unreasonably" from
what the majority of bank customers in her neighborhood did with regard to
their bank statements. The "general banking customer usage" in this regard
might turn out to be fairly favorable to her position, particularly as there is no
requirement in section 4-406 that banks tell their customers of the duty under
section 4-406 to examine their bank statement or of the potentially serious con-
sequences that may flow from their failure to do so. Nevertheless, this argu-
ment probably would not fly. The customer's duties with regard to bank
statements have always been spelled out explicitly in section 4-406, while the
bank's duties with regard to proper payment have always been stated in murky
terms at best. Thus, a customer general usage that did not involve prompt
statement examination would undoubtedly constitute one "disapproved by this
Article" by analogy to the terms of sections 4-103(c) and 3-103(a)(7). Bank
wins.
165. Cf Wilder Binding v. Oak Park Trust & Sav., 552 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ill.
1990) (Calvo, J., dissenting) ("Defendant is, in effect, relying on its customers'
duty of review to fulfill its own duty of ordinary care."); Hanover Ins. Co. v.
Brotherhood State Bank, 482 F. Supp. 501, 509 (D.Kan. 1979) (rejecting banks
contention "that the demands of modern banking justify an interpretation of
the banks' and customers' duties under the code that would place the full re-
sponsibility of detecting payee alterations upon the customer").
166. U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 4 (1990).
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tion of ordinary care will benefit all customers, at the expense of
the few it affects, because the use of automated check processing
keeps the cost of accounts down. One can quibble with this ar-
gument on several grounds. First, because individuals are will-
ing to pay a small amount to avoid a small chance of a large
loss, 16 7 one can argue that, given the choice, customers would
rather pay slightly more for their accounts in exchange for leav-
ing the primary obligation for discovering unauthorized signa-
tures on the banks. 168 Further, an allocation of liability that left
the primary obligation on banks to discover unauthorized signa-
tures would be both more efficient, because the bank is in a bet-
ter position to spread the loss resulting from a forged check than
is the average customer,169 and preferable from a policy stand-
point, because it would be more likely to encourage the develop-
ment of procedures that would result in the detection of forged
checks.' 70 Finally, as a practical matter, one can be somewhat
skeptical of any suggestion that this new definition of "ordinary
care" will result in a lower cost for customers. After all, current
customer account charges were established under a regime in
which banks in a number of jurisdictions still faced potential lia-
bility for their failure to verify check signatures and in which
167. Rubin, supra note 5, at 564-65.
168. For instance, in Zapata, the bank paid $109,247.16 of forged checks
from depositer's account, while the bank's evidence showed that abandoning its
sight verification procedure had resulted in savings of $125,000 annually.
Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat-l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 292, 294(1st Cir. 1990). Certainly a reasonable customer might be willing to pay a small
share of $125,000 in order to avoid the possibility of bearing the entire burden
of a $109,000 loss. As Rubin notes, "the cost to customers of such losses is
greater, in a real sense, than the cost of spreading the loss to all customers."
Rubin, supra note 5, at 565.
169. According to Rubin, an efficient allocation system normally would allo-
cate to the customer only enough loss to encourage the customer to take reason-
able precautions. Rubin, supra note 5, at 564. The bank should bear the rest of
the loss "because the financial institution can spread it through the price it
charges to all users of the system, and because the institution is in the best
position to decide how much money to spend on avoiding the loss." Id.
170. "Consumers virtually never devise long-range loss avoidance strate-
gies, and they have no opportunity to alter the nature of the check collection
system;" banks, on the other hand, "design the system, and banks can avoid
losses by restructuring it, by training their employees, or by developing new
technologies." Id. at 568. For instance, banks currently are experimenting
with optical scanning devices that could allow them to verify their customers'
signatures on checks consistently with an automated check processing system.
Id. at 568-69. The revisions' allocation of the burden of verification to individ-
ual customers, however, leaves the banks with little incentive to pursue this
technology. Instead, the revisions seem to encourage banks to reduce signature
verification procedures to an absolute minimum.
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banks had assumed that risk as a cost of doing business. It
seems unlikely that the banks will now lower account charges
because they no longer have this potential liability. Certainly,
the Code provides no motivation for banks to pass these particu-
lar savings along to their customers instead of their
shareholders.
The Prefatory Note to the revisions provides a more
straightforward explanation: it lists the addition of section 3-
103(a)(7) as one of the benefits of the revisions to the banking
community, stating that the section is designed to lower the
costs of collection and to reduce the banks' risks under federal
requirements regarding expedited funds availability. 171
One might suppose that although this particular provision
favors banks over customers in the interest of reducing the
banks' costs, it would be offset by other risk-of-loss provisions
reflecting similar accommodation of bank customer concerns.
This, however, does not seem to be the case. Indeed, at the same
time that the revisions lessen the banks' burden of compliance
with its duties under section 4-406, revisions to section 4-406
itself make it more difficult for the customer to comply with her
bank statement inspection duties under that section, again in
the interest of accommodating technological advances that re-
duce the banks' costs.
The bank collection process contemplated by the original
Article 4 was one that involved the physical transfer of checks
from depositary to payor banks. Advances in technology, how-
ever, have made it more cost efficient for banks merely to for-
ward the payment information contained on the MICR line of
the check electronically to the payor bank, rather than sending
the checks themselves.'7 2 Accordingly, the revisions specifically
allow electronic presentment. 173 Use of electronic presentment,
however, means that checks are no longer available for return to
the payor bank's customers along with their statements. Thus,
the customer loses the service of return of her checks, and for
purposes of compliance with her obligations under section 4-406,
the most important piece of information from which she can dis-
cern unauthorized checks. Nevertheless, section 4-406(a) pro-
vides that the customer receives sufficient information to trigger
her obligations under section 4-406 if she receives a statement
containing the information that can be obtained by the payor
171. Prefatory Note, U.C.C. Art. 3, Negotiable Instruments (1990).
172. Rubin, supra note 5, at 574.
173. U.C.C. § 4-110 (1990).
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bank's computer: the item number, the amount, and the date of
payment. 174 The comments recognize that this so-called "safe
harbor" rule, which is designed to facilitate the banks' ability to
lower the costs of check processing through the use of check re-
tention plans, creates a hardship for bank customers who keep
less than perfect records.'7 5 The substance of revised section 4-
406, however, does not reflect this recognition. It contains no
provision designed to alleviate the recordkeeping burden placed
on customers by loss of return of their canceled checks-not
even a provision so seemingly innocuous as, for instance, requir-
ing a bank to provide its customers with checkbooks that make
carbon copies of checks before the bank may take advantage of
the safe harbor rule. Although section 4-406 provides a "safe
harbor" for banks, it lets customers fend for themselves. 176
174. U.C.C. § 4-406(a) (1990). Conspicuously absent from this list are the
name of the payee and the date the check was written.
175. Comment 1 states as follows:
A customer who keeps a record of checks written, e.g., on the check
stubs or carbonized copies of the checks supplied by the bank in the
checkbook, will usually have sufficient information to identify the
items on the basis of item number, amount, and date of payment. But
customers who do not utilize these recordkeeping methods may not.
Id. cmt. 1. See also Hillebrand, supra note 141, at 686-87 (discussing U.C.C.
§ 4-406(a)).
176. Comment 1 states:
[t]he policy decision is that accommodating customers who do not keep
adequate records is not as desirable as accommodating customers who
keep more careful records. This policy results in less cost to the check
collection system and thus to all customers of the system.
U.C.C. § 4-406 cmt. 1. This is an inadequate justification even in its own terms.
Although lower system costs may justify the decision to encourage banks no
longer to return canceled checks, it does not justify the failure to include provi-
sions to accommodate the customer's loss of return of her checks.
The most helpful provision would be one requiring that, in addition to the
information listed in the safe harbor rule, the bank also must provide the name
of the payee and the date the check was paid.
Hillebrand notes that "[elven the National Association of Cash Managers, a
corporate 'user group,' commented during the drafting process that the names
of the payees and the dates of checks should be included on a bank statement
when the checks are not returned." Hillebrand, supra note 141, at 687. Com-
parable entities in other payment systems, such as credit card issuers provide
this information.
Nevertheless, even a provision such as that suggested in the text would
have gone a long way towards alleviating the recordkeeping burdens that this
section creates for customers. Indeed, even a requirement in section 4-406 that
the bank provide a disclosure on the customer's bank statement informing her
of her duties under section 4-406 and the consequences of her failure to comply,
similar to the disclosure currently contained on bank statements with regard to
electronic fimds transfers, would be helpful. See id. at 700-03 (discussing other
consumer protection provisions necessitated by truncation). The policy decision
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Thus, at the same time that the revisions to Articles 3 and 4
relieve the banks of the obligation to employ the signature ver-
ification procedures most likely to fulfil their duties under sec-
tion 4-406, these revisions place an additional burden on
customers to develop more stringent recordkeeping procedures
so they can continue to fulfill their duty of prompt inspection
and reporting without the benefit of their canceled checks. Bank
wins.177
IV. SOME LESSONS FROM HISTORY?
Review of the Code's drafting history reveals some consis-
tent themes regarding the influence of interest group politics on
the Code, and, more broadly, the role that interest groups play
in the politics of the uniform laws process itself.
A. INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
First, it is clear that interest groups have affected the Code
from its inception in a number of different ways. The needs of
an interest group-the Merchants' Association of New York-
were, at least indirectly, the catalyst for the Conference to un-
dertake the Code project, and the Code is not alone among uni-
form laws in this regard.178 Interest groups also were a primary
reflected in the safe harbor rule does not seem to be so much a choice to accom-
modate customers who keep careful records at the expense of customers who do
not as a choice to accommodate banks at the expense of both these groups.
The revisions to section 4-406 do lengthen the period that is presumed to be
a reasonable time in which to examine one's bank statement from fourteen to
thirty days. Compare U.C.C. § 4-406(2)(b) (1989) with U.C.C. § 4-406(d)(2)
(1990). That this provision deserves mention as a significant consumer benefit,
however, is only further evidence of how little consideration the revisions to this
section give to the interests of bank customers. Instead, they focus almost ex-
clusively on accommodating the banks in their desire to change their ways of
doing business with the minimum amount of cost or potential liability.
177. This epigram apparently is known, at least by some who have taken a
bar review course, as the "Epstein Rule." See Marianne M. Jennings, I Want to
Know What Bearer Paper Is and I Want to Meet a Holder in Due Course: Reflec-
tions on Instruction in UCC Articles Three and Four, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 385,
394. Professor Jennings states:
David Epstein used to say the fundamental rule of law on Bank Depos-
its & Collections (Article 4) is "Bank Wins." Banks can decide if they
want to take a check and, if they do, and it turns out to be no good, they
can take it out of your account anyway.
Id.
178. For instance, lenders instigated the drafting of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code, one of the Conferences most consumer-oriented pieces of legisla-
tion because they saw it as an opportunity to bring uniformity to state usury
laws and to do away with restrictive state licensing requirements that pre-
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source of information about the operation and needs of the in-
dustries affected by the Code. To the extent that the Code draft-
ers did research beyond studying decided cases and utilizing the
knowledge of the sponsoring organizations' members, they
looked to the business interests affected by the Code as the pri-
mary sources of their information. 179 In addition, these interest
vented their entry into certain local markets. White, supra note 35, at 2130
n.160. These creditor interests subsequently abandoned the UCCC when it be-
came more consumer-oriented because of input from consumer interest groups.
Id. Powerful interest groups sometimes view the uniform laws process as a way
to take advantage of opposing interests. Consider, for example, the following
anecdote, told by Allison Dunham, the first Executive Director of the Confer-
ence, about another instance of political lobbying by the banks:
Then I became associated with the uniform commissioners as executive
director, and I got back into Article 9 when a banker in Denver made a
representation to me as executive director that the commissioners
ought to draft a uniform real estate security act; by which he really
meant that the commissioners should, if they could, seek the repeal of
the Mechanic's Lien Act.
The banker told me a story that brings me back to Article 9. He
had a bill that he had presented to the Colorado legislature, trying to
make the bank loans on security of real estate construction, in particu-
lar, easier. He, in effect, was repealing the Mechanic's Lien Act, and
he hired a lawyer in Denver to go handle the bill and get it through.
And the lawyer said, "We're proceeding along fine." And then sud-
denly they hit a roadblock and it didn't pass to their surprise. So then
he hired another lawyer to find out why it didn't pass, and the lawyer
came back and said, "Well, the reason it didn't pass is because another
vice-president of your bank in charge of commercial loans decreed that
it would not pass."
Now, why were the commercial people interested in the mechanic's
lien? Very simple; the lumber yards could give good credit and sell
their accounts receivable if they could assure the bank that the ac-
counts receivable were secured by mechanics liens. And that brought
it back to reality.
Dunham, supra note 72, at 570.
179. See TwNIG, supra note 18, at 316-317. Professor Twining associates
the Code drafting process with what he calls "the committee room model" of
legislative drafting, a model that rejects independent empirical research in
favor of"a general willingness to accept as an adequate substitute the undiffer-
entiated opinion-evidence of experts, interest groups and others." Id. at 313-14,
319. Under the committee room model:
[A] committee or commission, consisting mainly of "experts," all or
most of whom are lawyers, considers an area of law which is thought to
be in need of reform and makes recommendations which may or may
not be embodied in the form of a draft bill. Typically, "evidence" is in-
vited from interested parties, from experts and, sometimes, from the
public at large. Such evidence may be mainly factual, but may well be
a mixture of fact, opinion and prescription, based on the experience of
the witnesses, their conception of their own or the public interest, and
judgments by lawyers about what would be technically feasible and de-
sirable. Typically, little or no systematic research is undertaken by the
committee itself and, if research is undertaken, it is nearly always
armchair or library research, which rarely goes further than an in-
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groups did not simply remain suppliers of technical knowledge;
rather they used their access to the drafters and the sponsoring
organizations to make their views about the preferred substance
of the law known. Indeed, with regard to banking interests, the
history of the Code shows that they have tended to demand-
and often have received-an active role in the actual drafting of
Code articles that affected their interests.
In fact, Professor Miller states that one of the "lessons" the
Conference learned from the NPC experience was that drafts
were more likely to be accepted if "drafting meetings [were]
public and representatives of groups interested in the proposed
legislation [could] and indeed [were] encouraged to attend." 8 0
With regard to the Article 3 and 4 revisions, the interested
groups encouraged to attend were largely banks and bank inter-
est groups. Official advisers to the drafting committee included
representatives from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
National Westminster Bank USA, the American Bankers Asso-
ciation, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the New York
Clearing House Association.' 8 ' Informal advisers who regularly
participated in the drafting meetings included representatives
of U.S. Central Credit Union, Chemical Bank, Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Company, the Bankers Clearing House Associa-
tion, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, the Credit
Union National Association, Citibank, N.A., Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A. and the California Bankers Association. 8 2 These
advisors,
communicated to the drafting committee the pressing operational
problems and other concerns, and how particular draft provisions were
likely to be accepted by various constituencies.... Moreover, the advi-
sors contributed to the prevention of provisions that otherwise would
have surfaced as "trial balloons" for reaction and thus could have been
quiry into the existing state of the law. Typically, systematically gath-
ered empirical data are not considered as a necessary basis for making
recommendations and there is generally a faith in the adequacy of ex-
perience and common sense to provide sufficient relevant information
which is sufficiently reliable. Rigorous empirical research involving ac-
cepted social science techniques is not considered necessary or even
relevant.
Id. at 314.
180. Miller, supra note 2, at 410.
181. Prefatory note, U.C.C. Art. 3, Negotiable Instruments (1990). The re-
maining official advisers were from the American Bar Association, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, and the National Corporate Cash Management Association. Id.
182. Id. The only participants representing bank customer interests were
individuals from corporations and from the National Corporate Cash Manage-
ment Association, which represents corporate bank customers. See id.
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perceived as giving the project a more radical cast than was actually
intended.1 8
3
Miller indicates that "[t]he consensus thus earned has produced
the rapid and widespread enactment of Article 4A, [the new arti-
cle drafted to deal with wholesale wire transfers] and hopefully
will do the same for the revisions of Articles 3 and 4. "184
Finally, the history of the Code shows that interest groups
are one of the primary sources of support for the passage of the
Code in the state legislatures.' 8 5 Interest groups, and bank lob-
bies in particular, were prime players in determining the fate of
the Uniform Commercial Code as it moved through the state leg-
islatures.'8 6 The experience of the Code, vividly illustrated by
the drafting history of Article 4, is that a powerful business
lobby like the banking industry can and will block a uniform law
that does not meet its expectations.
B. DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION
That interest groups play an important role in the drafting
of laws, including uniform laws, is not a revolutionary concept.
Interest groups are, and always have been, an important dy-
namic in American politics. 18 7 The participation of special
183. Miller, supra note 2, at 410-11.
184. Id. at 411.
185. Again, this is true of the uniform laws process in general. See PARRIs N.
GLENDENING & MAVIS MANN REEVES, PRAGMATIC FEDERALISM: AN INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 193-94 (1977):
The success of the Conference in pushing uniform legislation rests
principally on the support that the drafts receive from groups equipped
to pressure for legislation in the states. The Conference has no diffi-
culty getting the drafts introduced, but it does not function as an or-
ganized pressure group for their adoption.... Legislation on which
those involved-such as the industry itself--disagree... stands little
chance of adoption.
Id. Cf Varat, supra note 43, at 29 ("States can, of course, independently decide
to adopt similar regulations, and they will often be pushed to do so by interstate
enterprises for whom diverse sets of regulations are costly or burdensome.").
186. When unhappy with the substance of the Code, banks demonstrated
their ability to block its enactment in the state legislatures. See supra note 108.
Once satisfied with the Code, banking interests such as the American Bankers
Association supported its introduction in various state legislatures. Philip
Monypenny, Interstate Relations-Some Emergent Trends, 359 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 53, 57 (1965). Thus, it is not surprising that the propa-
ganda campaign for original enactment of the Code "was directed almost solely
at financing institutions with their powerful state lobbies." TWINING, supra
note 18, at 292.
187. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE TRANS-
FORMATION IN AMERICAN PoiuTIcs: IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERALISM 207 (1986)
[hereinafter ACIR REPORT] ("mInterest groups have been a pervasive part of the
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interest groups in the uniform laws process is thus probably in-
evitable. It also is not necessarily bad. The functions that inter-
est groups serve in that process-initiation of drafting efforts,
provision of technical information, substantive input, and polit-
ical support for enactment-facilitate the effective functioning of
the uniform laws process and help ensure that the laws drafted
reflect the real needs they are designed to address.
The history of the Code, however, also reveals a more troub-
ling aspect to the influence of interest groups on the Code. That
history shows that some interests consistently wield a great deal
more influence over the substance of the laws produced than do
others. The Code drafters have attempted, when possible, to
deal with the demands of special interest groups by excluding
subject matter. In situations when exclusion is not viewed as
feasible, however, and when push comes to shove, certain inter-
est groups seem consistently to get their way at the expense of
others. In particular, with regard to the history of Article 4, past
and present, banks fairly consistently win out at the expense of
their customers.
Indeed, the history of the Code raises the concern that the
uniform laws process simply may be unable to accommodate the
interests of consumers at all because provisions protecting con-
sumer interests routinely have been excluded to avoid the possi-
bility that their inclusion would impair enactment. Thus, for
instance, Professor Miller has stated that the Conference's expe-
rience with the NPC "clearly taught that consumer provisions
may preclude or destroy the necessary consensus on the com-
mercial law."' 88 Moreover, Professor Miller's solution to this
problem is the one normally adopted by the drafters-he sug-
gests that consumer protection provisions are more appropri-
ately left to other state law or federal law.'8 9
The solution, however, is not that simple. Ignoring con-
sumer interests does not make them go away-consumer issues
are an integral part of much of commercial law today. For in-
stance, the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 do not exclude consumer
transactions from their coverage; indeed, given the volume of
transactions covered by Articles 3 and 4 that could be labelled
"consumer," such an exclusion probably would be impractical. 90
American political scene since the nation's founding."). For a general discus-
sion of evolving theories of interest group politics, see id. at 207-43.
188. Miller, supra note 2, at 413.
189. Id. at 415-16.
190. Application to both consumer and business transactions is a feature
that Articles 3 and 4 share with the Code generally. Unlike continental con-
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The revisions, however, also fail to distinguish between con-
sumer and nonconsumer transactions with regard to the rules
applied. Instead they deal consumer interests a double blow.
Not only do the revisions lack "afrmative" consumer protection
provisions, such as disclosure requirements and regulation of
banking fees and charges,' 91 but they also substantially ignore
the interests of consumers in the provisions they do contain,
while making those provisions fully applicable to consumer
transactions.192
Thus, by ignoring consumer interests, while at the same
time sponsoring legislation that covers consumer transactions,
the Conference does not avoid the problem; rather, it exacer-
bates it. A more logical approach would be to try to correct the
problem by studying the uniform laws process to determine why
it tends to produce legislation that favors business interests over
those of consumers.
C. SUCCESS
A final theme that emerges from the history of the Code,
however, is that the strategy of accommodating the interests of
powerful business groups, such as bank interests, that can block
enactment to the detriment of consumer interests is a strategy
that works. The Uniform Commercial Code is the Conference's
greatest success; the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, its most
"pro-consumer" piece of legislation, was at least from the stand-
point of state enactment, largely a failure. 93 Despite the biting
mercial codes, which, in accordance with the original "law merchant," apply
only to "merchants," the U.C.C., while in some circumstances containing spe-
cial provisions for merchants, "does little to undermine the long established
integration of the common law and the law merchant." TWINING, supra note 18,
at 311-12. Instead, "it treats the merchant and non-merchant alike, and sub-
jects the occasional transaction of the farmer or college professor, if it is of a
type covered by the Code, to the same rules which govern the commercial deals
of professional traders." STATE OF NEW YoRK LAw REVISION COMMISSION, 1
STUDY OF THE UNIFoRm COMmERCIAL CODE 109 (1955).
191. Miller, supra note 2, at 412, 415.
192. See id. at 409 n.7. Miller acknowledges that despite the decision to
leave consumer protection issues to other law, many provisions remain "that
affect[] both consumers and commercial transactions alike, such as those gov-
erning stop payment orders and liability for unauthorized instruments," and
these provisions "still furnish a ground for debate." Id.
193. Only eleven states enacted the U.C.C.C., usually with substantial non-
uniform amendment. Seven states and Guam enacted the 1968 version of the
U.C.C.C. 7 U.L.A. 225 (1993). Four states enacted the 1974 version of the Act.
7A U.L.. 1 (1993). The U.C.C.C. often is pointed to as evidence of the Confer-
ence's inability to get uniform legislation containing consumer provisions en-
acted. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2, at 414 n.21; White, supra note 35, at 2130
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criticism of Beutel and Gilmore, every state enacted the original
Article 4, and the revisions to Articles 3 and 4 are moving
through the state legislatures with astonishing speed and little
amendment. 194 Once satisfied, powerful interest groups become
powerful allies in pushing uniform legislation through the state
legislatures. Thus, in arguing that this feature of the uniform
laws process should be changed, one is arguing with success.
V. INTEREST GROUP THEORY AND THE UNIFORM
LAWS PROCESS
Why does the uniform laws process tend to produce com-
mercial laws that fail to protect consumer interests effectively?
What accounts for the insensitivity to consumer concerns so viv-
idly illustrated by the history of Article 4? Certainly, there is
little evidence to suggest that the favoring of business interests
over those of consumers is an intended result of that process, at
least in the sense of malice aforethought on the part of the draft-
ers. There is no reason-other than, perhaps, the substance of
some of the laws they produce-to doubt that the Code drafters
really do view themselves as neutral experts attempting to de-
velop the "best" laws to govern commercial transactions.
Rather, the answer seems to lie in the absence of adequate
consumer representation in the uniform laws process. Even the
most well-meaning decision maker is limited by the perceived
universe of possible choices. Thus, to the extent that an affected
interest is absent from the decision-making process, that inter-
est's perspectives on the problem and the solutions their inclu-
sion might inspire are likely to be absent as well. The central
question, therefore, seems to be why consumer interests do not
receive adequate representation in the uniform laws process.
Review of that process in light of interest group theory may pro-
vide some of the answers to this question.195
n.160; Kripke, supra note 81, at 583. Another of the Conference's pro-consumer
uniform laws, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, has been adopted in
only three states. JONATHON SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE AcTs AND PRAC-
TICES § 3.4.1.2.2, at 79 (2d ed. 1988).
194. As of June 1, 1993, twenty-six states had enacted the Revised Articles 3
and 4: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Update, supra note
4, at 14-15.
195. For a good discussion of the major theories of interest group behavior in
the political process, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRiCKEY, LAW AND PuB-
LIC CHOICE: A CRmcAL INTRODUCTION 12-37 (1991).
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First, interest group theory indicates that consumer inter-
ests are, in general, less likely to receive adequate representa-
tion than are business interests in an environment dominated
by interest groups because of the greater barriers to collective
action encountered by consumers. Second, it suggests this is
particularly true when the legislation involved deals with a sub-
ject matter, such as bank regulation, that is complex, unfamiliar
to the general public, and politically unexciting. Third, interest
group theory suggests that the dominance of business interests
over consumer interests is even more likely to occur when the
governmental entity legislating is a state rather than Congress.
A. THE NATURE OF SUCCESSFUL INTEREST GROUPS
The very nature of consumer interests versus those of busi-
ness interests such as the banking industry makes it less likely
that consumer interests will receive adequate representation,
even in representative bodies, such as the state legislatures and
the Congress. "Consumers" is a broad category of individuals-
almost as broad as the public itself. Interest group theory, how-
ever, indicates that smaller groups are those most likely to form
an effective coalition to advance their collective interests.196
Large, broad-based interests find it difficult to organize to
secure collective benefits for several reasons. First, because the
larger the group, the smaller the portion of the total group bene-
fit any member receives, there is less incentive for any individ-
ual member of a large group to undertake collective action than
there is in a smaller group, where the benefit to any individual
group member may be sufficient to motivate that individual to
take the initiative.197 Large groups also suffer from "free rider"
problems in attempting to gain support for collective action. Be-
cause a collective good inures to the benefit of all without regard
to any individual's efforts to obtain it, and because the contribu-
tion of any individual member is insignificant in a large group,
there is a tendency among individuals sharing a broad-based in-
terest to assume that others will pay the cost of obtaining the
good, while they will still share in the benefits. 198 Everyone as-
sumes that someone else will do it; therefore, nothing tends to
get done.' 99 On the other hand, in smaller groups, the contribu-
196. MANcuR OLsoN, THE LOGIC OF CoLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
TmE THEORY OF GROUPS 52 (1971).
197. Id. at 48.
198. Id. at 44-45.
199. Id. at 50.
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tions of each member are more obvious and each member is sub-
ject to pressure from the other members to participate.200
Larger groups also face higher organizational costs than smaller
groups, for the larger the group, the more agreement and organ-
ization it will need.201 Because of these characteristics, groups
with broad-based interests are much less likely to engage in col-
lective action than are smaller groups representing "special
interests." 20 2
In the decision-making process, the organizational advan-
tages possessed by smaller, more cohesive special interest
groups translate into a prediction that "regulation will divert
wealth from relatively diffuise groups towards more organized
groups whose members have strong individual interests in the
regulation's effects."203 Those large groups, such as consumers,
"who are not in a position to make themselves heard will not be
registered in the calculus that produces the final outcomes gen-
erated by the policy makers." 20 4 Therefore, the interests of the
industry affected by the decision tend to prevail. 20 5
Thus, interest group theory suggests that consumer inter-
ests suffer from inherent organizational disadvantages even in
representative, politically accountable decision-making bodies
200. Id. at 62-63.
201. Id. at 46, 48.
202. Id. at 166.
203. Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1277, 1279 (1989).
204. Id.
205. Thus, for instance, Professor Jonathan R. Macey, discussing regulation
of bank risk, states that:
[Blanking law and policy often do not bear even the appearance of pub-
lic-spiritedness.... [for] reasons . . . rooted in the collective action
problem that faces the highly variegated consumers of banking serv-
ices, who are not in a position to press for laws that benefit overall
societal welfare. The well-organized special interest groups that domi-
nate the legislative process, as it pertains to the banking industry, do
not appear to benefit by pressing for regulations that increase effi-
ciency. Rather, these special interest groups appear to benefit most
from rules that transfer wealth from less organized consumers to more
organized producers.
Id. at 1279-80. The Code's allocation of risk of loss under revised section 4-406,
discussed supra Part III. D, is another illustration of Professor Macey's point.
Although 4-406 may not provide the most efficient allocation of risk of loss, it
does provide one that results in a wealth transfer from bank customers to
banks. Banks can use less expensive automated check processing procedures,
while individual customers normally will bear the losses resulting from the in-
ability of those procedures to detect forged checks. Customers must either de-
tect and report such forgeries promptly and force the bank to recredit their
account through litigation if the bank does not do so voluntarily, or bear the loss
of the funds represented by the forged check.
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based, somewhat ironically, upon the fact that these are inter-
ests shared by a large number of individuals. Because the Con-
ference is less visible and less accessible than representative
institutions, use of the uniform laws process to draft legislation
increases this organizational disability in several ways.
First, most people have never heard of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Indeed, many
lawyers may have little idea what that organization is. Still
fewer could say which uniform laws the Conference is in the pro-
cess of drafting at any given time. Uniform laws do not even
reach the full body of the Conference until a draft has been com-
pleted. Thus, to the extent consumers do organize, their collec-
tive action efforts are not likely to be addressed to the
Conference. One may call one's Congressional or state represen-
tative to voice concerns, but few people are likely to call their
NCCUSL Commissioner.
In addition, the drafting procedures of the uniform laws pro-
cess do not contain any provisions designed to insure, or even
encourage, representation of affected interests. Not only is
there no formal, structured way for public concerns to be
voiced-there are, for instance, no public hearings held regard-
ing proposed uniform laws-there is not even a formal proce-
dure for obtaining input from all affected industry groups or any
requirement that the drafters do so. As discussed in Part II, the
only group that drafting committees are required to consult is
the American Bar Association.
Of course, as the history of the Code illustrates, this lack of
a formal consultation requirement has not prevented extensive
consultation by the Conference with interested groups-indeed,
the Conference learned from the Code experience the value of
consultation with affected industries, both informally, and more
formally through placing industry representatives on advisory
committees, and since that time has routinely included such
consultation in the drafting process. To the extent that one can
find a pattern in the Code drafters' affirmative contacts with in-
terest groups, however, those contacts appear to have been
driven more by the need to obtain information regarding com-
mercial practices, and to anticipate potential sources of support
or opposition to enactment, than by the desire to be deliberately
representational. As a consequence, the drafters' affirmative
contacts have for the most part been directed at the business
interests that will be regulated by the legislation, rather than
those who will deal with that industry. It is the industry whose
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transactions will be regulated that can supply the drafters with
the technical information they need, and that industry also is
likely to have a powerful lobby that must be dealt with anyway
in the course of having the uniform law enacted.
Further, to the extent the Conference is motivated by a de-
sire to be deliberately representational during the drafting pro-
cess, it too is hampered by its lack of visibility and accessibility
in achieving that goal. Because of the Conference's low profile,
the drafters of uniform laws may not even know of all interested
constituencies at the drafting stage. The failure of a particular
group to become involved in the drafting process does not neces-
sarily mean that the group is uninterested in the law being
drafted; the group may merely be unaware of the Conference's
activities.20 6
Therefore, the drafters must resort to the somewhat hap-
hazard procedure of guessing, based on their own experience,
which interests should be involved and who should be contacted
to represent those interests, with the consequent danger that
significant interests may not be heard. Although this weakness
in the uniform laws process can result in the exclusion of impor-
tant business interests as well as consumer interests,2 0 7 the
206. Cf. White, supra note 35, at 2130. White states that, "the Commission-
ers must draft a law without explicit current input from interested constituen-
cies, and, in some cases, without even a clear understanding of the identity of
all the interested parties." Id.
207. For instance, at the time of the original drafting of Article 9, dealing
with secured transactions, finance companies rather than banks were the pri-
mary industry engaged in asset-based financing. Kripke, supra note 81, at 578.
Yet finance companies apparently were not consulted with regard to the initial
drafting of Article 9.
Homer Kripke, then an attorney for CIT Financial Corporation, found out
about the Article 9 project when he was given a first draft of Article 9 by an-
other lawyer who received the draft at a Conference meeting. Id. at 577.
Kripke happened to know Allison Dunham, who was co-reporter for Article 9.
Id. He contacted Dunham and had him arrange a meeting with Llewellyn to
discuss the draft. Id. At this meeting, Kripke reports Llewellyn "was very
ready to admit mistakes and he told me that he was particularly glad to have
someone who knew something practical about the business, because he knew
that all of the reportorial staff then lacked that information about secured chat-
tel transactions." Id. Kripke was appointed to the drafting committee, id.,
where he became an influential voice for the position of secured creditors.
A more recent example relates to Article 4A, the new article dealing with
wholesale wire transfers. The National Corporate Cash Managers Association,
which represents corporate bank customers, a primary consumer of wholesale
wire transfer services, was not consulted during the initial drafting of Article
4A. Rubin, supra note 5, at 590. When the initial drafts of Article 4A, which
included provisions allocating loss to bank customers rather than to banks
(who, of course, had been consulted) later came to that organization's attention
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problem seems particularly acute with regard to consumer rep-
resentation. First, those involved in the drafting committee and
in the Conference are most likely to be lawyers representing
commercial clients; thus, those clients are both more likely to be
aware of Conference activity affecting their interests and more
likely to have those interests adequately represented by existing
participants in the process than are consumers.208 In addition,
the variegated nature of "consumer" interests means that find-
ing adequate representatives for those interests may be more
difficult than finding an adequate representative for a more co-
hesive group.209 If the uniform laws process were more open,
"[the cash managers appeared in force at the next meetings on Article 4A." Id.
The final version of Article 4A contains loss allocation provisions representing a
compromise between banks and users. Id. at 591.
These two examples illustrate that the Conferences current method of ob-
taining input can cut out important business interests as well as consumer in-
terests. They also illustrate that the substance of the laws the Conference
drafts is significantly influenced by the interests represented.
208. Compare Professor Twining's description of the nature of the interests
represented during the original drafting of the Code:
[The "democracy" of the process was a qualified democracy. Despite
extensive consultation and public discussion the project was inevitably
under the control of a tightly knit group. Moreover, the membership of
the [Conference] and ALI was composed very largely of judges, leading
private practitioners, whose main clientele would tend to be capitalist
enterprises, and a sprinkling of established academic lawyers. Law-
yers of all kinds tend to have a vested interest in the status quo; a
reasonably high proportion of the members of both organizations, espe-
cially the ALI, could be expected to be moderately "liberal," but with-
out seriously challenging established institutions and ways of doing
things. The overwhelming majority of those consulted could also be
expected to share similar values: bar associations, large law firms,
banks, commercial interest groups, and individual lawyers. The voices
of organized labour, small consumers and opponents of the capitalist
system were muted or inaudible. Two classes of people who might
have been advocates of a different viewpoint, the ordinary politician
and radical-minded academic lawyers, had limited scope.
TWING, supra note 18, at 291.
The importance of increased participation by lawyers who represent con-
sumer interests in the Code drafting process was an issue raised in both the
AALS and the ABA Business Section panel discussions. See supra note 5. At
the AALS discussion, the suggestion was made that academic lawyers should
be encouraged to become more actively involved in Code drafting projects to
serve as representatives of consumer interests. At the ABA discussion, lawyers
working for consumer groups were encouraged to become actively involved.
Somewhat less sympathy, however, was expressed for the concerns voiced that
consumer advocate lawyers are likely to be somewhat disadvantaged in their
ability to participate in Code drafting projects by the practical realities of time
and money.
209. Cf ANDREw S. McFARLAND, Public Interest Lobbies Versus Minority
Faction, in INTEREST GROUP PoLnics 324, 342 (Allan J. Cigler & Burdett A.
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adequate consumer representatives might appear through a pro-
cess of natural selection. Because it is not, the Conference runs
the risk in selecting consumer representatives of finding that
the representatives it has chosen do not represent the views of a
sufficient number of consumers.210
Beyond the interests that are obvious sources of information
and political support, the informal procedure for obtaining advi-
sors means that groups who become involved in the drafting pro-
cess tend to be those who are familiar with the Conference or
with its members, and are thus in a position to hear about the
project "through the grapevine." Again, these are more likely to
be business interests than consumer ones.
B. THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES
The likelihood that consumer interests will be under-repre-
sented in the decision-making process is even greater when the
issues involved are complex-dealing with subjects requiring
specialized knowledge-and politically unexciting. In areas in-
volving technical knowledge, the public generally will "find it ir-
rational to obtain the information necessary to identify their
interests on any given issue and moreover will be ill-equipped to
interpret any information they do obtain." 211 Obtaining such
information is costly for the general public, and at the same time
"the probability that such information can be used to affect leg-
islative outcomes is very low" for any given consumer. 212 Fur-
ther, technical issues, such as those involved in banking
regulation, are not politically exciting to the average person.
Unlike civil rights or foreign policy, they are not the kinds of
issues in which members of the general public might become in-
Loomis eds. 1983) ("[A] claim to represent 'the public interest' can be accepted
or rejected according to a wide range of political and social values.").
210. Consider, for example, Professor Kripke's description of the Confer-
ence's difficulties with regard to the Uniform Consumer Credit Code:
I was right [that consumer provisions would hinder enactment of the
Code] because when (years later) we drafted the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UCCC), even then it proved too soon to reach a consensus
on consumer credit issues, and that Code bogged down in legislature
after legislature. Even our efforts during the drafting period of the
UCCC to bring consumer representatives into the drafting process
proved to have been a failure, because the representatives Allison
[Dunham] and others carefully selected were later repudiated by some
more radical consumer spokesmen.
Kripke, supra note 81, at 583.
211. Macey, supra note 203, at 1289 (quoting MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS




volved because they "provide people with the feeling of satisfac-
tion from participating in the political process."2 13 Consumers
are less likely, therefore, to become involved with complex issues
and those deciding the issues thus are less likely to receive con-
sumer input into their decisions.214
By contrast, the business interests involved have both ready
access to the necessary information-it is part of their ordinary
business operations-and a real interest in pursuing these is-
sues.215 When the issues involved are complex, therefore, it is
even more likely that the only voices policy makers will hear are
those of the industry special interest groups, who understanda-
bly present to those policy makers "the version of the facts that
is most favorable to their point of view." 216 Consequently, the
policy course followed is likely to be the one "preferred by special
interest groups because such groups will dominate the flow of
information" received by the policy makers. 217
Thus, added to the inaccessibility of the drafting process to
the average person is the nature of the commercial law issues
with which the drafters are dealing. The very complexity of
technical issues such as those involved in the check collection
process makes it unlikely that consumers will become involved
on their own initiative. If, for example, consumers knew that
under the revised Articles 3 and 4 the bank need not recredit
money it debited from a customer's checking account because of
the bank's failure to honor a valid stop payment order unless the
customer first sues the bank and establishes the validity of her
claim against the holder of the check,2 18 those consumers might
213. Id. at 1280.
214. Id. at 1289-90.
215. Id. at 1289.
216. Id. at 1290.
217. Id.
218. Section 4-403(3) provides: "The burden of establishing the fact and
amount of loss resulting from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop
payment order is on the customer." U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (1989). This provision
was inserted in the Code "as a trade-off for the banks when the drafters decided
to allow customers to give oral stop orders." WHITE & SUMMRs, supra note
164, § 18-6, at 796. Courts have split on the issue of what this language re-
quires the customer to prove in order to establish her prima facie case: is it
sufficient for the customer to establish the banks payment over a valid stop
payment order or must the customer also establish that she had a defense to
payment of the check, and thus, that she had suffered loss by failure of the bank
to stop payment? See id. § 18-6, at 798-99.
Initial drafts of the Article 4 revisions amended section 4-403 to provide
that the bank must recredit its customer's account when it has paid over a valid
stop payment order; the bank would then have to prove that the customer had
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be concerned. If they knew that, despite the signature card that
they sign and the bank's duty to pay only on an authorized sig-
nature, they are the ones who bear the burden of determining
whether one of the checks the bank has paid has been forged,219
they might want to voice a contrary opinion. If they knew that
these revisions mean they probably no longer will receive their
canceled checks with their statement, and thus will be required
to discover forged checks from their statements alone,220 while
at the same time their banks will be able to charge them
whatever they like for the privilege of getting a copy of checks
they need,221 consumers might get a little hot under the collar.
If consumers knew these sorts of things, perhaps they would
start to get a little excited about Articles 3 and 4. The Confer-
not suffered any loss because of its error. Rubin, supra note 5, at 578. The
initial draft also required the customer to provide an affidavit regarding the
reasons for stopping payment as a condition of having her account recredited.
Id. The banks, however, objected to this revision, arguing "that they usually
recredit a customer's account anyway, so no legal requirement was necessary."
Id. The revisions ultimately left section 4-403(3) essentially unchanged. Id.
Compare U.C.C. § 4-403(3) (1989) with U.C.C. § 4-403(c) (1990).
As Professor Rubin notes, requiring a customer to sue the bank to have her
account recredited, even though the bank admittedly has debited the account
despite a valid stop payment order, "vitiate[s] the entire value of the stop order
when such an error occur[s]." Rubin, supra note 5, at 577. From the cus-
tomer's point of view, she is left at the mercy of the bank-relying on its good
will to recredit her account for the amount debited by virtue of its mistake. See
WHrE & SuMMERs, supra note 164, at 798 (noting the "importance to the cus-
tomer of the bank's decision to re-credit or not re-credit after paying over a stop
order"). If the bank refuses to recredit, the requirement that she bring suit will
as a practical matter, make it highly likely that the only affordable course will
be to "lump it." Rubin, supra note 5, at 569-70, 577-78. On the other hand, the
banks' opposition is hard to understand-if banks normally recredit an account
anyway, why should they object if this particular "usage of the trade" is re-
flected in the applicable legal rule?
219. See discussion supra Part III. E.
220. Id.
221. Revised section 4-406 provides that if items are not returned to custom-
ers, the items, or a copy of them, must be retained for seven years. U.C.C. § 4-
406 (1990). Section 4-406 further states that: "[a] customer may request an
item from the bank that paid the item, and that bank must provide in a reason-
able time either the item or, if the item has been destroyed or is not otherwise
obtainable, a legible copy of the item." Id. § 4-406(b). It does not, however, set
forth any penalty for the bank's failure to provide the item within "a reasonable
time." Further, in keeping with the revision policy of avoiding "affirmative"
consumer protection provisions, the section is silent on the issues of whether
the bank may charge the customer for providing the check and the appropriate
limits on such a charge. Rubin, supra note 5, at 575; see Hillebrand, supra note
141, at 702-03 (recommending that states adopting the Article 3 and 4 revisions




ence, however, is never likely to have consumers breaking down
its doors to provide input into the uniform laws process without
some education of consumers about the impact of these technical
and rather boring statutes upon their lives. Indeed, it is hard
enough to get law students to slog through them, even with an
examination ax hanging over their heads. 222
Thus, interest group theory suggests that consumers con-
front inherent obstacles in organizing to represent their collec-
tive interests which business interests do not face. This theory
further suggests that, for complex issues involving specialized
knowledge, like those the Code often addresses, the high cost of
obtaining the information necessary to understand and appreci-
ate the policy choices involved presents additional disincentives
to consumer input.
The history of the Code, however, suggests that the uniform
laws process reflects a very different view of group dynamics.
That process seems to be based on the logical assumption that
those who care enough about an issue will take affirmative steps
to make their views known; therefore, those who do not make
their views known simply do not care enough. If this were an
accurate description of group dynamics, then the type of infor-
mation and enactment driven process reflected in the history of
the Code might make perfectly good sense. One could assume
that the information provided accurately reflected the views of
those most concerned with the subject matter involved, and that
the strength of opposition or support for particular provisions
voiced accurately measured the actual strength of feeling of
those most affected.2 23
222. No doubt anyone who has ever taught or taken a commercial paper
course needs no support for this statement; nevertheless, see generally, Jen-
nings, supra note 177 (discussing students' confusion over negotiable instru-
ments). Although the provisions of these articles are still technical and obtuse,
the articles now are at least set forth in a fairly straight-forward style. Profes-
sors Jordan and Warren deserve commendation, because their revisions have
substantially cleaned up the language of Articles 3 and 4.
223. Indeed, similar beliefs about group behavior prevailed in the 1950s:
In the 1950s, political scientist David Truman and other "group theo-
rists" argued that the panoply of organized interests was a roughly ac-
curate measure of the interests held by individuals. Groups theorists
believed that (1) people know their own interests; (2) they are able
without inordinate difficulty to organize these interests into political
groups; (3) American political institutions provide numerous opportu-
nities for organized interest groups to influence the political process;
(4) the resulting public policy is usually representative, because it re-
flects the balance of power among organized interests, whose relative




As the discussion above illustrates, however, this is not an
accurate picture of group dynamics. Modern interest group the-
ory suggests, somewhat counterintuitively, that the voice of the
few is the one most likely to be heard loudest, to the detriment of
the many. The Conference's lack of visibility and accessibility
leads to the conclusion that this is even more likely to be true in
the drafting of uniform laws.
C. STATE ENACTMENT AND THE CODE
So far, this analysis has focused on the drafting process by
which articles of the Code are developed and revised. One might
argue, however, that whatever the deficiencies of the drafting
process in representing all interests concerned, that process has
no impact on any interests unless its final product is enacted by
the state legislatures, which are representative, politically ac-
countable bodies. Thus, one might assert that even if represen-
tational deficiencies exist at the drafting stage, they are subject
to correction through the political process of states' enactment of
the legislation.
There are, however, a number of countervailing forces at
work during the enactment stage of the uniform laws process
that make the fact of state enactment an inadequate mechanism
for the correction of whatever imbalances between business in-
terests and consumer interests have occurred during the draft-
ing process. Some of these factors have already been discussed
in connection with the drafting process; some are inherent in the
nature of state versus federal policy making; and some are pecu-
liar to the uniform laws process itself. Together, they lead to the
conclusion that consumer interests whose concerns are not re-
flected in the draft legislation presented to the state legislatures
are not likely to be able to change that legislation to reflect their
concerns at the enactment stage.
1. Interest Groups and Decentralized Decision Making
First, the organizational problems of collective action by
consumers discussed above apply as well to their ability to or-
ganize effectively to represent their interests in the state legisla-
tures. These are problems inherent in the nature of large
groups, burdening their efforts at collective action in every fo-
rum. In addition, to the extent consumer interests do overcome
McFARLAND, supra note 209, at 337 (footnote omitted). Modem group theory,
however, has discredited these assumptions. Id.
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these burdens and organize, their lobbying efforts are more
likely to be focused at the federal, rather than the state level. It
is less expensive to obtain passage of one federal statute than to
obtain passage of fifty state statutes because a different legisla-
ture must be lobbied in each state.224 Thus, an interest group is
likely to prefer federal over state legislation unless the benefits
from a series of local statutes outweigh the transaction costs of
obtaining state legislation. 225 For consumer groups, who have
higher organizational costs than smaller, more cohesive groups,
federal legislation is likely to remain the most efficient means of
obtaining uniform legislation. Further, as discussed below,
political theory indicates that federal legislation also is more
likely to reflect consumer interests.
Business interests, on the other hand, have long and well-
established lobbying organizations at the state level. This is
particularly true for banking organizations such as the Ameri-
can Bankers Association, whose members are accustomed to in-
teracting with both state and federal regulators because of the
dual system of bank regulation.226 Such a group also has the
type of structure that makes it well-suited for supporting a cam-
paign for enactment of the same legislation in fift state legisla-
tures-it is "organized from the top down," and therefore can
provide centralized guidance for lobbying efforts at the state
level to promote a uniform policy solution across state lines.227
Thus, while the existence and strength of consumer lobbies
varies widely from state to state,228 groups such as the Ameri-
can Bankers Association have strong lobbies in every state. In-
deed, as the history of the Code illustrates, it is the recognition
224. Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Eco-
nomic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federal-
ism, 76 VA. L. Rlv. 265, 271 (1990).
225. Id.
226. The American Bankers Association, organized in 1875, is one of the old-
est trade associations in the United States, and representing banking views of
proposed legislation always has been one of its important functions. ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 33 (Glenn G. Munn & F.L. Garcia eds., 8th ed.
1983). Over 90% of the nation's commercial banks are members. Id. at 32. Its
working groups are organized into four major divisions: "the National Bank
Division, dealing with banks holding charters from the federal government; the
State Bank Division, working with banks holding state charters; the Savings
Division, concerned with savings banking; and the Trust Division, which works
particularly with matters relating to the trust business." Id. at 33. In addition,
there is a "State Association Section, the membership of which consists of the
executive officers of state bankers associations." Id.
227. See ACIR REPORT, supra note 187, at 239.
228. See Rubin, supra note 105, at 1274.
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of the legislative clout that a business interest such as the bank-
ing industry has with the state legislatures that gives them
much of their influence over the Code at the drafting stage.
Added to the stronger organizational position that business
interest groups have with state legislatures is the support of
those involved in the uniform laws process itself. The Confer-
ence extracts a commitment from its commissioners to have uni-
form laws introduced in their states, although it does not require
them to work for the laws' enactment. 229 Further, those who
assist in drafting the uniform laws do work actively for their en-
actment, and the Conference also works to enlist local bar asso-
ciation support to assist in the lobbying efforts to have uniform
laws passed.230 Indeed, because uniform legislation promul-
gated by the Conference is passed through the American Bar As-
sociation for approval, at the enactment stage it bears the
imprimatur of that organization as well.23 1 The efforts of the
Conference and its contacts, therefore, are added to those of in-
terest groups who support uniform laws like the Code in the
push for their enactment in any given state.
Thus, at the enactment stage of the uniform laws process,
consumer groups face not only the organizational disadvantages
they generally encounter in attempting collective action, but
also certain other organizational disadvantages created by the
uniform laws process itself. Special interest groups like banks,
with their inherent structural advantages and the support of the
Conference and the bar associations, are much better equipped
to lobby for the passage of a proposed uniform commercial law in
state legislatures than are consumer groups to organize against
enactment without amendment to better reflect their interests.
2. The State Legislatures and the Uniform Laws
Added to the organizational disadvantages that consumer
groups face in lobbying against passage of a uniform law are cer-
tain pressures on state legislatures that tend to make amend-
ment in favor of consumer interests at the enactment stage
unlikely. First, the goal of proponents of uniform legislation is
enactment by the states without amendment to preserve the con-
229. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
230. See GLENDENING & REEvEs, supra note 185, at 193-94 (noting that state
bar associations are particularly important in the enactment of uniform laws).
231. See id. ("When the organized legal profession is united behind a propo-




cept of uniformity. After all, the whole idea behind the uniform
laws process is for the states all to enact the same law. Thus,
built into the concept of uniform laws is an inherent bias against
their amendment by the state legislatures during the enactment
process. The "success" of a uniform law is measured not only by
its enactment in a number of states, but by its enactment with
as little amendment as possible.
Further, this pressure to avoid amendment tends to trans-
late into an argument that the state legislatures should rely on
what the drafters of the proposed law have done-to trust that
their expertise and knowledge of the area have produced the
"best" solution to the problem-and not conduct a substantial,
independent inquiry into the appropriateness of the legislation.
There are good reasons for supporters of uniform legislation
to make this argument. First, the drafters no doubt believe it to
be true, and the draft law they have prepared may very well
reflect the "best" solution based on consideration of the interests
that have been represented during the drafting process. In addi-
tion, the two criticisms commonly leveled at the uniform laws
process are that it takes too long and that non-uniform amend-
ments by the individual enacting states tend to dilute its effec-
tiveness in providing uniform national rules. 23 2 The history of
the Code's enactment reveals that both of these weaknesses of
the process are exacerbated by independent investigation on the
part of enacting state legislatures. Pennsylvania, the first state
to enact the Code, enacted it quickly and without amendment.
Pennsylvania also enacted it without independent investigation
on the strength of the recommendation of Conference President
William Schnader, who had served as that state's attorney gen-
eral.233 When the New York Law Revision Committee decided
to conduct an independent study of the Code, however, it not
only held up enactment in New York for almost ten years but
also seriously slowed the momentum for Code enactment in
other states. In addition, its study resulted in substantial
232. Indeed, as discussed earlier, these concerns initially caused Llewellyn
to reject the uniform laws process as a mechanism for reforming sales law. See
supra note 51 & accompanying text. See also Taylor, supra note 44, at 337
("State-by-state enactment is an invitation to local amendments because it
gives each state legislature an opportunity to deviate from the 'uniform' act.").
233. Peter Coogan, Reflections of a Drafter: Peter Coogan, 43 OH ST. L.J.
545, 546 (1982); Kripke, supra note 81, at 580 n.14 ("Pennsylvanians assert
that the vital first enactment of the Code in Pennsylvania occurred because the




amendment of the Code. 23 4
A number of factors also make the reliance argument a
fairly persuasive one from the point of view of the state legisla-
tors. First, the drafters of uniform laws are experts in their
fields-often highly respected experts-and the laws they draft
tend to display a high degree of technical competency. Cer-
tainly, this is true of the current revisions to Articles 3 and 4.
The reporters for that project are respected commercial law
professors, and the drafts of Articles 3 and 4 they have produced
are of a very high technical quality. Further, as discussed
above, at the enactment stage the major industries regulated by
the law are behind it, as are most of the lawyers. Thus, it is
logical for legislators to accept uniform laws as proposed.
Second, the same considerations that discourage consumers
from becoming interested in laws involving complex issues re-
quiring technical knowledge also tend to make the average legis-
lator defer to the experts. Legislators "cannot come close to
mastering all of the detail of the incredible array of issues with
which they are confronted on a daily basis."235 Thus, like the
general public, legislators are unlikely to have knowledge of the
technicalities of complex commercial transactions and are likely
to find that "it simply does not pay ... to inform themselves
about such issues in sufficient detail to make informed judg-
ments about what is in the best interests of their
constituents." 236
For instance, Professor Macey argues that the complexity of
banking issues explains the great deference Congress gives to
congressional committees dealing with these issues:
In large part, the evidence shows that the ability of legislative commit-
tees to formulate the agenda of a proposed legislative package gives
the committee extraordinary power. Although the complexity of the
issues already gives the legislative committee a virtual monopoly on
the relevant information about the pros and cons of a proposed legisla-
tive package, the committee's power is further enhanced because it
does not pay for other lawmakers to become informed about the intri-
cacies of the policies under the command of the relevant committee.2 37
Similar considerations no doubt incline state legislators toward
reliance upon the drafters of complex uniform commercial law
statutes, such as Article 4. Legislators logically can assume that
the drafters of uniform laws have obtained the relevant informa-
234. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text.
235. Macey, supra note 203, at 1288.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1289 (footnotes omitted).
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tion about the pros and cons of the legislation during the draft-
ing process, consulted with the relevant interest groups, and
produced a final product that appropriately reflects the relevant
considerations.238 These assumptions seem particularly reason-
able because uniform laws are drafted by representatives of
"neutral" and distinguished sponsoring organizations, rather
than drafters representing a particular interest group. Thus,
there is likely to be considerable reliance upon the judgment of
the drafters by state legislators who have neither the time nor,
perhaps, the inclination to master the details of banking law.
Indeed, Professor Homer Kripke has suggested that the
Conference's purpose should be not only to obtain uniformity of
state laws but also to encourage delegation of the process of
drafting and codifying the law in complex, technical areas such
as those covered by the Code-what he terms "lawyers' law'--to
"select groups of lawyers with specialized knowledge, as distin-
guished from leaving it to the generally trained lawyers and
non-lawyers of the legislatures." 239 Kripke asserts that the
drafters should "train the legislatures to realize that they do not
have the time or the competence to interfere with 'lawyers' law,'
and they should be willing to accept almost automatically both
original statutes and amendments thereto put forth by highly
qualified select drafting groups." 240
Finally, the pressure not to alter a uniform law as proposed
is enhanced by "the threat of preemption"--if the states do not
pass uniform laws in an area, then the federal government will
step in and take over the field. This "threat of preemption"-or,
to put it another way, this invocation of states' rights-has been
used by Code supporters as an argument to persuade the states
to avoid amendment of the Code during the enactment process
238. Professor Philip Monypenny has suggested that one purpose of the
Conference in drafting commercial legislation is to reach accord among the vari-
ous special interest groups concerned with the legislation at the drafting stage.
Monypenny, supra note 186, at 57. According to Monypenny, the Conference's
adjustment of conflicts among these interest groups enables state legislatures
"to act with confidence in highly technical fields not only with respect to their
legal aspects, but also with regard to the interests which had to be adjusted in
the course of the drafting." Id. At the enactment stage, the legislature is
presented with a "carefully drawn project[] which ha[s] the united support of
appropriate organizations and interests." Id.
239. Homer Kripke, A Reflective Pause Between UCC Past and UCC Future,
43 OHO ST. L.J. 603, 604 (1982).
240. Kripke, supra note 81, at 584. Kripke suggests that one way to obtain
legislative reliance is to develop a broad consensus on laws before they are
presented to the legislatures by utilizing advisors and involving the relevant
committees of the American Bar Association. Id.
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so that the commercial interests who need uniformity will not
have to resort to federal legislation in order to obtain it.241
The pressures against amendment associated with the
drive for uniformity, of course, have not prevented nonuniform
amendment by the states at the enactment stage. Indeed, Penn-
sylvania was the only state to adopt the original Code without
any amendment, 242 and New York was not alone in pursuing a
course of independent study of the Code before deciding to enact
241. Indeed, Schnader himself, although known as a strong supporter of de-
centralized government, played the preemption card in an attempt to convince
the states to enact the Code without amendment. Noting that the states had
not followed Pennsylvania's lead in enacting the Code without amendment,
Schnader continued:
I think that the time has come for making extraordinary efforts to have
State Legislatures eliminate from their Codes all non-uniform varia-
tions, except those made necessary to conform to local procedure....
If the State and other jurisdictions having the Code on their books
fail to render their Codes uniform by the end of 1968, it may become
necessary to have Congress enact the Code in order to have the com-
mercial law of the United States uniform throughout the nation.
Perhaps the very proposal to prepare the Code for federal enact-
ment will expedite the cleaning up of the Codes of the states and other
jurisdictions so as to make the Code substantially uniform everywhere
and thus render federal action unnecessary.
William A. Schnader, The Uniform Commercial Code-Today and Tomorrow,
22 Bus. LAw. 229, 230-32 (1966) (emphasis in original). Compare the recent
statements of John M. McCabe, Legislative Director and Legal Counsel of the
Conference, urging the commercial law community to support the Article 3 and
4 revisions:
The specter of federal preemption does not abate, but continues to
grow as the United States approaches this final decade of the 20th
Century ....
Everybody who reads this Symposium should take into account
the question, what happens if this enterprise of revision does not suc-
ceed? Can we rely upon the federal government?
In the matter of reliance over time, there is no alternative to the Uni-
form Law Commissioners and the state legislatures.
The prospect suggests substantial reliance upon the institutions
that have deigned to bring these revisions before you .... Reliance
and forbearance must be your watchwords. We must allow uniformity
to become the primary value in evaluating the work on Articles 3, 4
and 4A. Otherwise, the unthinkable may be thought, and the commer-
cial law be uniform no more.
John M. McCabe, Foreword, 42 AIA. L. REv. 367, 370-71 (1991).
242. See WHrrE & SuMMEus, supra note 164, § 3, at 7 (discussing
nonuniform amendment and noting that "[tihe Uniform Commercial Code is
not uniform"); Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws 152 (1966) (report of William Schnader) ("[T]he fact is that as
the Code stands on the statute books of 49 jurisdictions, it is not a uniform
Code.").
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it.243 Nevertheless, these pressures do place an additional bur-
den of persuasion on anyone seeking to amend the uniform law
at the enactment stage, a burden that is particularly heavy for
consumer interests when coupled with the organizational disad-
vantages under which those interests already operate in that
process.
3. State versus Federal Legislation
To the above-mentioned considerations, which work against
the ability of consumer interests to change the content of a uni-
form law at the enactment stage, must be added the general ten-
dency observed by political scientists for state legislation to
favor business interests over those of consumers. State govern-
ment "tends to be dominated by corporate, professional, and
bureaucratic lobbies for the status quo," 244 and, thus, the legis-
lation states pass tends to be less effective in protecting the in-
terests of consumers vis a vis these business interests.245 A
"state legislature has a narrower set of interests within its area
of jurisdiction, whereas the national legislature is responsible to
the vast array of interests spread among the entire United
States."246 Consequently, special interests often find it possible
to maintain a position of strength at the state level that they
could not maintain at the national level where they would have
to compete with a broader range of other interests and thus
would have less influence.247 Further, "some large corporations
have financial resources greater than many state governments,"
and "many states lack the necessary administrative machinery
to provide thorough supervision" with regard to regulation of
businesses. 248 Therefore, it is not surprising that "[o]ften...
corporate interests find it more compatible with their goals to
advocate the expansion of state jurisdiction at the expense of the
243. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 2, at 805-06 (describing enactment of the
Code in Massachusetts).
244. McFALAND, supra note 209, at 348-49.
245. Id. at 330 (citing KAREN OnREN, CORPORATE POWER & SOCIAL CHANGE
(1974)). This is, of course, only a tendency. State legislatures sometimes have
taken the lead in passing legislation to correct imbalances between business
and consumer interests in the commercial law area. For instance, several state
legislatures already had passed statutes prescribing funds availability periods
at the time Congress passed the Funds Availability Act of 1987. Rubin, supra
note 105, at 1257. Most of those states, however, also had strong consumer
movements. Id.
246. HARMON ZEIGLER, INTEREST GRouPs IN AmERIcAN SocIETY 44 (1964).




national government." 249 Indeed, the tendency of special inter-
est groups to dominate at the state level has led some political
scientists to conclude that "[tihe decentralized and fragmented
nature of American political institutions frequently helps the
few defeat the many."250
The above considerations suggest that the enactment pro-
cess for uniform laws often will not provide a sufficient antidote
for inadequacies in representation of consumer interests that oc-
cur at the drafting stage. Indeed, it appears that the uniform
laws enactment process is more likely to perpetuate any inequi-
ties between consumer and business interests present in a uni-
form law. Because that process requires the concerted lobbying
effort of an interested group in the legislatures of fifty states, it
is fraught with high transaction costs for consumer groups. It is
well-suited, however, to the already existing lobbying structures
of a business group such as the American Bankers Association.
Further, the bias against amendment of proposed uniform legis-
lation and concomitant tendency to dissuade state legislatures
from independent study and evaluation of that legislation built
into the process create additional burdens for a group seeking to
change the draft at the enactment stage. Finally, the audience
to whom uniform laws are addressed-the state legislatures-is
the one most likely to be favorably disposed to the interests of
business groups.
Thus, modem principles of group theory suggest that in
both of its phases-drafting and enactment-the structure of
the uniform laws process creates a bias in favor of business in-
terests and against effective representation of consumers. In-
deed, viewed in light of these principles, the uniform laws
process seems almost custom-made for the creation and enact-
ment of pro-business legislation. The private and inaccessible
process by which uniform laws are drafted is the method proba-
bly least likely of all to obtain input from consumer interests,
and the product of that drafting process is then presented as a
fait accompli for enactment by the legislatures most likely to
favor business interests. At the same time, the result of the pro-
cess is the largely uniform national commercial standard that
business interests need to function effectively in an integrated
national economy. It is no wonder, therefore, that drafters of
uniform legislation find business interests to be those most in-
terested in the uniform laws process, or that they find that
249. Id.
250. McFARL D, supra note 209, at 333.
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favoring those interests over consumer interests produces suc-
cessful uniform commercial laws---"successful" at least in the
sense that they are laws capable of enactment.
VI. WHY SHOULD THE CONFERENCE CARE?
The concepts of interest group theory discussed above
demonstrate that the design of the uniform laws process tends
to result in legislation that favors business over consumer
interests. They also show, however, that there is a tendency for
consumer interests to lose out to business interests in represen-
tative legislatures-after all, these theories were developed to
describe interest group behavior in the context of democratic in-
stitutions, not in the context of the uniform laws process. Thus,
it might be suggested that arguments based on interest group
theory prove too much. In other words, a defender of the uni-
form laws process might argue that interest group theory does
not so much suggest that the uniform laws process is flawed as
suggest that our political system is flawed. Why should the Con-
ference in particular be concerned?
A. THE LACK OF PoLITIcAL AccouNTABITY
First, of course, the fact that consumer interests are
likely to be disadvantaged in representative as well as non-rep-
resentative institutions merely indicates that all policy-making
bodies need to be sensitive to these concerns in designing and
implementing decision-making structures. Further, because the
structure of the uniform laws process creates additional obsta-
cles to consumer collective action not encountered by consumers
in political fora, it seems that drafters of uniform commercial
laws need to be even more consciously aware of these
considerations.
In addition, the non-representative, politically unaccounta-
ble nature of the organizations involved in the uniform laws pro-
cess both deprives that process of an important protection
against undue influence and makes the laws it produces particu-
larly vulnerable to such a charge. The greater visibility and
openness built into the structure of political bodies, and the ulti-
mate political accountability of their members to the general
public, not only give them some incentive to consider the inter-
ests of the general public in a consciously representational man-
ner, but also provide them a constituency upon which to draw to
19931
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counteract the influence of special interest groups.251 Indeed,
representative government has been pointed to as a primary
countervailing force to special interests. 252 These "political"
protections against the influence of special interests are not
present in the sponsoring organizations of uniform laws.
Further, although some political analysts are quite skepti-
cal that representative government actually provides an effec-
tive check on special interests, it certainly is true that the theory
of representative government, whether it always works in prac-
tice or not, provides a type of legitimacy to the decisions made by
politically accountable bodies that the Conference's decisions
lack. The Conference gains legitimacy for its laws, not from
their democratic origins, but from the neutrality of their drafters
and the nonpolitical nature of the drafting process that produces
them. The idea is that these laws are not the product of the
pressures of politics, but politically neutral "best" solutions to
the problems with which they deal.
Thus, even if it were true that a state legislature drafting a
law to allocate loss between banks and their customers would
come up with an allocation just as pro-bank as that of Articles 3
and 4, the law nevertheless would have a certain legitimacy
merely because the state legislature had produced it, and even
though it was clear to everyone that it favored a particular
group. On the other hand, such favoritism on the face of a uni-
form law undercuts the major source of legitimacy the sponsor-
ing organizations of uniform laws have-their neutrality.
B. THE ROLE OF THE UNIFORM LAWS PROCESS IN THE
DYNiMIcs OF FEDERALISM
Perhaps most importantly, the Conference has a particular
duty to consider the effect of interest group politics on the uni-
form laws process because of the unique position that process
occupies within the scheme of U.S. federalism. The uniform
laws process has always existed within the interstices of federal-
ism. Its position there, however, has changed over the years, as
our conception of the appropriate balance between federal and
state power has changed. When the Conference was created in
251. Cf McFARLAND, supra note 209, at 345 (discussing way in which politi-
cians come to advocate the ideas of public interest groups).
252. See, e.g., id. at 335-37 (discussing impact of elections on minority fac-
tion dominance); FARBER & FIcKEY, supra note 195, at 20 ("Responsiveness to
broad constituencies is not only an important aspect of representation, it also
helps ameliorate the influence of special interests . ").
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1892, the uniform laws process was viewed as a method for ob-
taining uniformity in subject matter areas considered outside
the powers of the national government.253 The Conference filled
the power vacuum left by the pre-New Deal Supreme Court's re-
fusal to interpret national power as commensurate with the
need for nation-wide solutions. It operated in the area in which
the national government could not legislate and in which legisla-
tion by individual states disrupted the economic and political in-
tegration of the nation.
Thus, for example, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,254 Justice
Sutherland rejected the notion that Congress should be able to
"legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompe-
tent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter-
rupted by the exercise of individual legislation." 255 Instead he
stated:
There are many subjects in respect of which the several states have not
legislated in harmony with one another, and in which their varying
laws and the failure of some of them to act at all have resulted in inju-
rious confusion and embarrassment. The state laws with respect to
marriage and divorce present a case in point; and the great necessity of
national legislation on that subject has been from time to time vigor-
ously urged. Other pertinent examples are laws with respect to negoti-
able instruments, desertion and non-support, certain phases of state
taxation, and others which we do not pause to mention. In many of
these fields of legislation, the necessity of bringing the applicable rules
of law into general harmonious relation has been so great that a Com-
mission on Uniform State Laws, composed of commissioners from
every state in the Union, has for many years been industriously and
successfully working to that end by preparing and securing the pas-
sage by the several states of uniform laws. If there be an easier and
constitutional way to these desirable results through congressional ac-
tion, it thus far has escaped discovery.2 56
A year after the decision in Carter Coal, however, the
Supreme Court made the discovery that had eluded Justice
Sutherland.2 57 The Supreme Court's expansive interpretation
of the Commerce Clause and the concomitant expansion of fed-
eral regulatory power filled the void once occupied only by the
uniform laws process with the power of the national govern-
253. Dunham, supra note 12, at 236.
254. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Sutherland, J.) (striking down Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 as outside Congress' power).
255. Id. at 292.
256. Id. at 292-93.
257. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (uphold-
ing the National Labor Relations Act as a valid exercise of the commerce power
despite its regulation of manufacture and production activities because of the
economic effect those activities have on interstate commerce).
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ment. The Conference moved from being a facilitator in an area
where no government entity could operate effectively to being a
competitor with national legislative action.258 It thus is not sur-
prising that the Conference often promotes the uniform laws
process as an alternative to federal legislation-a way to obtain
nation-wide uniformity of the substantive law while avoiding
the federal intervention that normally would accompany that re-
sult-and, thus, as a means of protecting state autonomy and
state's rights.259
As the discussion of interest group theory in Part V illus-
trates, however, the consequences from the choice of state over
federal legislation go beyond merely maintaining state control
over a subject area. The choice of a state or a federal forum also
may affect the substance of the law that is produced. State leg-
islatures tend to be more susceptible to special interest groups
representing business interests. This phenomenon is reflected
in the substance of state legislation, which tends to favor these
interests over those of consumers.260 On the other hand, since
258. The Conference's position thus became one primarily located within the
area of concurrency, where both the national and state governments have
power to legislate. See 1988 Criteria, supra note 21, at § 1(a). As Section 1(a)
provides:
The subject matter must be appropriate for state legislation in view of
the powers granted by the Constitution of the United States to the
Congress. If it properly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Congress, it is obviously not appropriate for legislation by the several
states. However, if the subject matter is within the concurrent juris-
diction of the federal and state governments and the Congress has not
preempted the field, it may be appropriate for action by the states and
hence by the Conference.
Id.
259. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 12, at 237; White, supra note 35, at 2102;
ARmSTRONG, supra note 18, at 129. Dunham states:
From the very beginning.... it has been a theme that uniformity of
law by voluntary state action was a means of removing any excuse for
the federal government to absorb powers thought to belong rightfully
to the states. As the power of the federal government has expanded,
the presidents' reports of the Conference have more often emphasized
this "states rights" objective.
Dunham, supra note 12, at 237. White argues: "With the removal of the consti-
tutional barriers against federal laws governing most elements of a private citi-
zen's life, the same fear that caused the constitutional barriers in 1789 should
again trouble the citizens, now exposed to federal power." White, supra note
35, at 2102. He asserts that the Conference "may find this new-found fear of
federal power to be a reason for their organization," as they can "be a rallying
point for the states against federal encroachment." Id. Armstrong also states,
"The voluntary enactment of uniform state laws by the state legislatures seems
to be generally accepted as more desirable and more feasible than an expansion
of federal power." ARMSTRONG, supra note 18, at 129.
260. See supra Part V. C. 3.
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the founding of the nation, federal legislation has been sug-
gested as the cure for undue influence by factions, as the greater
number of interests represented in the national legislature
tends to operate to dilute the power of special interest groups.261
Further, because of the potential effect of the choice of legis-
lative forum on substantive outcomes, a common political strat-
egy of special interest groups with influence at the state level is
to try to narrow the "scope of conflict" by arguing for state
rather than federal regulation of areas affecting their interests
in the hope that this strategy will avoid the influence of public
interest groups on the resulting policy decisions.2 62 Indeed,
some have suggested that "federalism does not involve a strug-
gle between the nation and the states, but rather a struggle
among interests who have favorable access to one of the two
261. See TnE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 83-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). Madison states that:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties
and interests composing it; .... Extend the sphere and you take in a
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that
a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights
of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in
unison with each other....
[it clearly appears that the same advantage.., enjoyed by a large
over a small republic is enjoyed by the Union over the States compos-
ing it....
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their
particular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration
through the other States. A rage for.., any... improper or wicked
project will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a
particular member of it, in the same proportion as such a malady is
more likely to taint a particular county or district than an entire State.
Id. Because he belived minority factions in a state would be checked by the
principle of majority rule, Madison primarily was concerned with the undue
influence of majority factions at the state level. Id. at 80. His comments re-
garding the protections against factions afforded by the broadened range of in-
terests represented at the national level, however, seem equally pertinent with
regard to protection against those who, while not a numerical majority, never-
theless wield a majority of political power in a particular state.
262. Scope of conflict theory says:
the breadth of participation in resolving political issues is central to
politics. If the scope of conflict is narrow, if participation is very re-
stricted, then specialized economic interests will triumph. On the
other hand, if the scope of conflict is broad, if many groups participate
in the resolution of an issue, then the political outcome is likely to be
very different. Accordingly, much of the art and strategy of politics
consist of manipulating the scope of conflict to determine the outcome
of a political issue.
McFARLAND, supra note 209, at 329. McFarland states that "well-organized
special interests will manipulate the context of political conflict to prevent 'pub-
lic interests' from manifesting themselves in the conflict." Id. at 333.
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levels of government,"2 63 and that, in this context, "the cry of
'states' rights' [can] become an important part of the struggle
among pressure groups." 264
Normally, however, the geographic boundaries of a state's
legislative jurisdiction limit what a state legislature can do for a
business interest operating on a national scale.2 65 As James
Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 10, federalism reflects the
notion that state governments and the national government
should serve different functions. 266 Its genius is in creating dif-
ferent levels of government to more effectively deal with differ-
ent types of issues: national representatives address issues of
concern to the nation as a whole, whereas state representatives
address issues of interest to a particular state.267 Delineation of
263. ZEIGLER, supra note 245, at 48.
264. Id. at 46-47. Zeigler notes that because it appeals to our basic federal-
ist values, the use of a states' rights argument by an interest group seeking to
avoid national regulation can be very effective: "the 'specter of a centralized
federal bureaucracy invading the reserved rights of the states' is invoked on the
assumption that our values are biased toward a commitment to 'grass roots'
democracy." Id. at 47 (quoting Robert J. Harris, States' Rights and Vested In-
terests, XV J. OF POL. 466 (Nov. 1953)).
265. This is not, however, always the case. Sometimes choice of law rules
can be used to manipulate applicable law so that the law of one state is all a
national corporation needs. Consider, for instance, Delaware corporate law.
Because state choice of law rules say internal affairs of a corporation are gov-
erned by the law of the state of incorporation, Eugene F. Scoles, & Peter Hay,
Conflict of Laws, § 23.2 (2d ed. 1992), the favorable rules of Delaware law are
all any corporation needs.
The sponsoring organizations of the Code have tried a similar strategy with
regard to Article 4A, dealing with wholesale wire transfers. That Article's
choice of law provision allows a funds transfer system to select by private rule
the state's law that will govern wholesale wire transfers any part of which util-
ize its system. U.C.C. § 4A-507(c). Parties to the transfer are bound by the sys-
tem's choice of law if they have notice that the funds transfer system may be
used in connection with their funds transfer. Id. The law of the jurisdiction
selected need not bear a reasonable relation to the matter in issue. Id. The
idea behind this provision was "that adoption of Article 4A by New York and
the selection of New York law by the [New York Clearing House Association]
CHIPS rules would result in Article 4A being applied to all CHIPS transactions
regardless of jurisdiction." David B. Goldstein, Federal Versus State Adoption
ofArticle 4A, 45 Bus. LAw 1513, 1516 n.15 (1990). As CHIPS is one of the major
wire transfer systems, New York's version of Article 4A could have a very sig-
nificant extraterritorial impact, not only nationally, but internationally.
266. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 260, at 83.
267. Madison states as follows:
It must be confessed that in this [issue of the appropriate size of a re-
public], as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which
inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number
of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all
their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too
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the precise point at which a particular issue becomes primarily
one of national rather than local concern is not easy, particularly
in the area of commercial law. Indeed, that demarcation is one
of the perennial struggles of our system-a struggle that in re-
cent times, the Supreme Court has left largely to the political
processes. 268 Nevertheless, although the application may be
subtle and complex, the theory at least is clear: at some point
issues are no longer local, and at that point, the appropriate pol-
icy-maker is the national government. At the point when this
occurs-when for our purposes business interests find that a
single state's law is ineffective in providing the climate that they
need for efficient commercial interaction-those interests are
motivated to seek federal legislation.
Thus, when the Merchants' Association of New York found
that the state law of sales had not provided the uniformity nec-
essary for business to operate effectively in the common market
of the United States, and the previously existing federal judicial
mechanism for obtaining uniform commercial laws had been de-
stroyed, they turned to the Congress and sought a federal sales
much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to
comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Con-
stitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and ag-
gregate interests being referred to the national, the local and
particular to the State legislatures.
Id.
268. With regard to Congress's regulation of private commercial interests,
the Supreme Court has long deferred to Congressional determinations of an
activity's impact on interstate commerce, and thus to Congress's power to regu-
late that activity under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971) (finding Congress may regulate a class of activities that has
a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce without proof that a par-
ticular incidence of that activity has any interstate effect); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding Congress may regulate if Congress had a
rational basis for finding that the regulated activity has a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding
Congress may regulate any activity which in the aggregate has a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce).
Even with regard to Congressional regulation of activity of the states pur-
suant to the Commerce Clause, the Court currently takes the position that the
states' primary protection from congressional overreaching is not the judiciary,
but rather the protections of state interests inherent in the national political
process. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (over-
ruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). The Supreme
Court, however, may be changing direction once again on this issue. See New
York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992) (striking down a provision of the
federal Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 as violative of the Tenth Amend-
ment); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S.Ct. 1069 (1991) (adopting plain statement
rule with regard to federal legislation that appears to regulate the states).
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bill to provide the necessary uniforMity. 2 6 9 In the normal course
of state and federal interaction, the need for uniformity in inter-
state commercial transactions logically leads to federal legisla-
tion and the concomitant broadening of the scope of conflict that
national decisionmaking entails.
As it did in the case of the federal sales bill, however, the
uniform laws process intejects itself into the dynamics of this
state-federal interaction, providing an alternative mechanism
for obtaining uniformity that does not require business interests
to give up any political advantage they may have over consumer
interests in the state legislatures. In doing so, the uniform laws
process gives business interests the best of both worlds: they get
the benefit of uniform commercial law rules on a national scale
without having to broaden the scope of conflict by going to the
national legislature to obtain them. Thus, they benefit from uni-
formity without incurring the risk that the strength of their po-
sition will be diluted by the broader representation of other
interests at the national level.2 70 At the same time, the current
structure of the uniform laws process makes it even more likely
that the narrowed scope of conflict will result in pro-business
legislation than would the normal state legislative process.
The impact of the uniform laws process on the dynamics of
federalism, however, goes beyond merely providing an alterna-
tive to federal legislation for interest groups that find state leg-
islatures more amenable to their position. Because the law
resulting from that process is likely to endure, the uniform laws
process can delay effective formation of national policy in areas
of national concern for significant periods of time-even, as in
the case of the Code, for decades.
The Uniform Commercial Code has been the dominant law
in the areas it covers for over forty years. Some of the laws that
it replaced, such as the Negotiable Instruments Law, had domi-
nated their subject matter for years before enactment of the
U.C.C.271 It hardly seems likely that these laws have domi-
269. See supra Part III. A.
270. Cf ZEIGLER, supra note 245, at 46-47 (quoting DONALD C. BLAISDELL,
AMERicAN DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE 50 (1957)) ("As ... has [been] noted:
Federalism is particularly pleasing... to the managers of industrial enterprise.
While their charters to do business are obtained not from the federal but from
state government, under federalism they get the benefits of a trade area of con-
tinental proportions, at the same time escaping effective national regulation.").
271. The Conference promulgated the Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 18, at 25. Every state had adopted it by 1924.
Braucher, supra note 2, at 799.
[Vol. 78:83
UNIFORM LAWS PROCESS
nated because an area like negotiable instruments is one pri-
marily of "local" concern or because commercial law is an area
"traditionally left to the states." The very fact that uniform
laws were found desirable on these topics refutes their "local"
nature.27 2 The commercial law was traditionally, if anything, a
law that did not even know national boundaries.273
A more likely explanation for the enduring quality of these
laws seems to lie in their impact upon the motivation of either
the states or the national government to legislate further in the
areas they cover. The passage of a uniform law has a decided
dampening effect on further innovation by the states. The pres-
sure for uniformity that biases the enactment process against
amendment also places pressure on the state legislatures not to
freely amend the law after its enactment. 274 Further, the exist-
272. See, e.g., 1988 Criteria, supra note 21, at § 3(3). "As a general rule, the
Conference should avoid consideration of acts on subjects that are... of purely
local or state concern and without substantial interstate implications unless
conceived and drafted to fill emergent needs or to modernize antiquated con-
cepts." Id.
273. The "law merchant" was a form of international law, whose funda-
mental elements were the ease with which it permitted binding con-
tracts, its stress on security of contracts, and the variety of devices it
contained for establishing, transmitting and receiving credit.... [It]
was, at least in theory, uniformly applied to dealings between
merchants of every nation.
MICHAEL E. TIGAR & MADELEINE R. LEVY, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 49
(1977); accord Braucher, supra note 2, at 811 ("[Tlhe law merchant is a tradi-
tion transcending both state and national boundaries."); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) ("The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly
declared.., to be in a great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of
the commercial world.").
274. Frank E. Horack, Jr., The Future of Uniform Laws-The Commercial
Code, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 555, 557 (1948) ("[Uniformity may frequently imply ex-
cessive stability in that it places a heavy sanction on the retention of the uni-
form law and an avoidance of experimentation with new and perhaps better
legal controls."). Indeed, Professor White makes an interesting point about the
durability of uniform laws, based on the differences in regulation at the state
and federal level, which suggests another reason why business interests might
choose state over federal law. In suggesting that the Conference may find a
raison d'etre as a rallying point for those fearing excessive federal intervention,
he states the following:
this fear of federal power may be enhanced because the power is exer-
cised not by a ponderous, deliberative body such as the Congress, but
by agencies of the federal government .... For example, bankers seek-
ing a particular set of rules to determine the banks' liability to custom-
ers might have more confidence in the stability of those rules if they
were stated in a uniform state law that could be changed only by the
acts of state legislatures than if the rules were found in regulations
authorized by Congress, but promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board. Under federal agencies, such regulations can be changed on
short notice and with modest debate.
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ence of a comprehensive state law dealing with a subject matter
area is also likely to delay any federal enactment in the area.
The interest groups that are most able to organize effectively are
satisfied with current law, and thus there is no push by them for
federal legislation. The burden of overcoming legislative inertia
thus is shifted to consumer interests-those least able to
organize.
Thus, to the extent the uniform laws process is effective, it
can delay the development of national legislation in areas that
have become areas of interstate concern for significant periods of
time. As a result, it also can delay the creation of national policy
with regard to those issues.2 75 Until an opportunity arises to
reassess the policy choices made by the uniform state legisla-
tion, either because some particular problem galvanizes an
interest group,276 or because some other piece of related legisla-
White, supra note 35, at 2103. Cf Rubin, supra note 105, at 1265 (identifying
need for regulatory structure as driving force behind "federalization" of law).
Innovation by state courts is another matter. State courts, for instance,
sometimes have provided protection of consumer interests lacking in uniform
commercial laws as originally enacted through judicial interpretation. For in-
terpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law, see, e.g., Unico v. Owen, 232
A.2d 405 (N.J. 1967) (denying holder in due course status to lender affiliated
with seller); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953) ("We think
the buyer-Mr.& Mrs. General Public-should have some protection some-
where along the line.").
Indeed, one premise behind the structure of the Code was the idea that
courts, rather than legislatures, would have a primary role in allowing the Code
to change over time. See supra note 72. On the other hand, disparate judicial
interpretations of the Code destroy uniformity and thus have led some to call
for federal commercial legislation. E.g., Harold A. Hintze, Note, Disparate Ju-
dicial Construction of the Uniform Commercial Code-The Need for Federal
Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 722; Taylor, supra note 44 (discussing various
causes of nonuniformity, including nonuniformity because of disparate judicial
interpretation).
275. Cf ACIR REPORT, supra note 187, at 243 (noting that ability of interest
groups with national concerns to lobby at the state level may lead to the "local-
ization of national issues"); GLENDENNIG & REEVES, supra note 185, at 199 (dis-
cussing interstate compacts). Glendening and Reeves argue that interstate
compacts often are instigated by special interests who feel more competent to
deal with the states rather than the national government. Id. The use of inter-
state compacts "to maintain state control of economic matters is not necessarily
detrimental to the national interest; but it could delay coordinated national ac-
tion in dealing with problems of nationwide concern." Id.
276. One example is the problem of excessive hold periods on customer de-
posits, which caused consumer interests to lobby the national government for
the Expedited Funds Availability Act of 1987, Pub. L. No 100-86, 101 Stat. 635
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1988)). See Rubin, supra note
105, at 1257. This Act not only dealt with funds availability, but granted the
Federal Reserve Board the power to issue regulations "to regulate ... any as-
pect of the payment system, including the receipt, payment, collection, or clear-
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tion comes up for consideration at the federal level277 the uni-
form legislation remains. Thus, the balances struck by the
drafters of uniform laws between competing interests are likely
to be balances that will endure.
These effects of the uniform laws process on the operation of
federalism place a significant responsibility on the Conference to
act wisely in proposing and drafting uniform laws. For, by de-
laying the formation of national policy in an area, the uniform
laws process delays consideration of that area at the level of gov-
ernment most likely to take into account the interests of all af-
fected groups. For instance, Code supporters have justified the
failure of the original Code to include consumer provisions by
noting that consumer protection was in its infancy at that time
and there was no consensus. 278 Indeed, some point to the lack of
support for the Uniform Consumer Credit Code as further evi-
dence that no consensus existed on these issues years later.279
One must consider, however, which is the cause and which the
effect. If the Code had not covered the field of commercial law so
comprehensively at the state level, business interests might
have sought uniformity of the commercial law through national
legislation; in the atmosphere of broadened representation at
the national level, issues of consumer protection might have
been raised much earlier.
VII. WHAT CAN THE CONFERENCE DO?
It is always much easier to criticize what exists than to
make suggestions for change. For that reason, it seems some-
what unfair to do the former without at least making some pre-
liminary attempt to do the latter. What follows are merely
tentative suggestions-as an outsider to the Conference, I am
not privy to a number of the considerations that necessarily will
ing of checks," and thus gave it the power to preempt most of Articles 3 and 4.
Id. at 1258-61.
277. For example, the revision of the bankruptcy laws altered the balance
that had been struck in Article 9 between secured and unsecured creditors. See
Kripke, supra note 81, at 579. Kripke states:
Despite having won in state law on the proposition that secured credit
ought to be facilitated because it is the means by which small business
finances itself, we find ourselves today operating under the new Bank-
rupty Code in which there is [a] whole series of provisions which are
intended to limit secured credit, permit the debtor-in-possession or the
trustee in effect to disregard it .... "
Id.
278. E.g., id. at 582-83.
279. See, e.g., id.; White, supra note 35, at 2131.
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influence the Conference's decisions about the desirability and
feasibility of any given alteration to its present process. Fur-
ther, every organization has an ethos known only to those famil-
iar with it. Thus, those who are involved with the uniform laws
process are in the best position to decide how to address its
problems. Nevertheless, several areas for consideration suggest
themselves.
A. OPEN UP THE DRAFTiNG PROCESS
It seems clear that the Conference and, to the extent it be-
comes involved in this process, the ALI, need to open up the uni-
form laws process-to make it more visible and accessible to a
wider range of interests-at the drafting stage. Adequate repre-
sentation of all affected interests is crucial if the Conference is
serious about its goal of drafting the "best" legislation with re-
gard to a given subject matter:
Representation not only affects the information available and the as-
sessment of that information, but also affects the kinds of solutions
that are developed and considered. Drafting a statute is not simply a
matter of choosing between existing approaches on the basis of one's
political predilections. It also involves the development of new ideas
and new statutory devices to deal with perceived problems.... To trig-
ger this process of innovation, the representation of opposing groups
... need[s] [to] be sufficient to present both perspectives forcefully, and
strong enough to motivate the drafters to seek new solutions.
28 0
The drafting stage is thus the critical stage at which to ob-
tain adequate input from all affected interests. As a practical
matter, it also seems to be the only stage at which the input of
consumer interests is likely to make any difference-once the
law is promulgated by the sponsoring organizations, the forces
described in Part V. C work against its change to reflect con-
sumer interests not previously included.
Further, interest group theory suggests that opening the
drafting process is going to require affirmative action on the
part of the sponsoring organizations to actively seek the partici-
pation of consumer representatives. The obstacles consumers
face in organizing for collective action, particularly with regard
to technical statutes, coupled with the Conference's lack of visi-
bility and accessibility to the general public, indicate that the
Code's sponsoring organizations cannot assume that consumer
representatives will appear of their own initiative.
The diversity of consumers also suggests that having one
280. Rubin, supra note 5, at 591.
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consumer representative, while it is better than having none, is
not likely to present the full range of consumer views on an is-
sue. Just as the Conference would not consider all business in-
terests affected by the Code to be adequately represented by the
appointment of one "business" representative, it must recognize
that multiple consumer representatives may be required as well.
In addition, just as the Code drafters have actively solicited in-
put from nonlawyers with regard to the concerns of business
groups, they also should include nonlawyers with consumer
views in the process.281 The sponsoring organizations also need
to take a broader view of when uniform commercial laws affect
consumer interests. The drafters cannot remove consumer in-
terests from the Code simply by deciding not to include affirma-
tive consumer protection provisions. Unless the drafters feel
comfortable including a provision in the draft of a uniform com-
mercial law that "This Article does not apply to consumer trans-
actions," then consumer interests are involved, and should be
provided with adequate representation.
281. As discussed in Part III. B, LIewellyn and his fellow drafters recognized
early on that in one sense, the real commercial law experts were the business-
men, not the lawyers. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text. It was the
businessmen who knew what was required for commercial transactions to oper-
ate in practice, although they lacked the specialized training necessary to
translate their knowledge into legal concepts. Similarly, one can argue that the
true experts regarding consumer problems are the consumers themselves-
those individuals who deal with the commercial system in the course of their
daily lives without the benefit of any specialized knowledge of the way that
system operates or of the legal concepts that govern it. Because these individu-
als, along with the businessmen, are those whose daily transactions are most
affected by the rules ultimately chosen, it seems imperative that their perspec-
tive be included.
In determining how to structure its drafting process to achieve effective
representation, the Conference may want to study the procedures developed by
other drafting bodies-for instance, administrative agencies-to obtain input
from interested groups in carrying out their rulemaking functions. See, e.g., 5
U.S.CJA. § 561 note (Supp. 1993) (setting out procedure for negotiated rulemak-
ing); 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.82-4, 305.85-5 (1993) (Administrative Conference recom-
mendations regarding procedures for negotiating proposed regulations); id.
§ 305.68-5 (Administrative Conference recommendations regarding representa-
tion of the poor in agency rulemaking).
The Article 9 Study Group, appointed by the PEB to determine whether
Article 9 should be revised, has taken the approach of creating a special task
force to evaluate the Study Group's "recommendations from a consumer-protec-
tion perspective and to identify additional consumer protection issues related to
secured credit." PERmANrr EDITORIAL BoARD FOR TME U.C.C., PEB STmUY
GROUP, UNIoRm COMMERCIAL CODE ART. 9, Report 3 n. 9 (Dec. 1992).
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B. PROVIDE THE STATES WITH A BASIS FOR INDEPENDENT
DECISION
The sponsoring organizations also need to make the state
legislatures more aware of the policy choices that have been
made in the course of drafting a uniform law presented to those
legislatures for enactment. The drafters of uniform legislation
do not view themselves as the proponents of a particular inter-
est. When they make a policy choice it is presumably for reasons
other than favoritism to one interest or the other. The choice
made, the alternative positions rejected, and the reasons for the
decision all need to be clearly articulated for the benefit of the
state legislatures. It is not enough to present them with the text
of the statute-particularly for complex statutes like Articles 3
and 4, the text of the statute is not likely to make the policy
choices that it represents obvious to the average legislator.28 2
The comments, at least as currently drafted, are also insuffi-
cient. They are not always available, and sometimes not even
drafted, at the time a state's legislature is considering a uniform
law.28 3 Moreover, the comments tend to be technical them-
selves, as they are designed to guide courts in the appropriate
interpretation of the Code rather than to guide legislators in
their enactment decision. 28 4 What is needed is the drafters' de-
tailed explanation of the major policy choices that have been
made-and the alternative choices that have been rejected-
during the drafting process, set forth in plain language and
human terms.
Although the drafters of uniform legislation understandably
are proponents of the laws they have drafted in the state legisla-
tures, they need to be willing to persuade the legislatures of the
merits of those laws on the basis of full information, and they
also need to be willing to allow those legislatures to reach oppo-
site conclusions, particularly in light of the Conference's own
lack of political accountability. If the uniform laws process is in
fact to serve as a means of maintaining state autonomy in our
federalist system, then the states need to be able to make an
informed choice in deciding whether to enact a proposed uniform
law.
282. See Macey, supra note 203, at 1289 (noting that the language of com-
plex statutes can hide the ways in which they benefit special interests).
283. WHrrE & SUmMERs, supra note 164, § 4, at 13-14.
284. See id. at 14. Professors White and Summers argue, "If the average
legislator who voted to enact the Code in a given state did not understand the
intricacies of Article Four or Article Nine at the time of enactment, it is likely
that he did not grasp the relevant comments either." Id.
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C. PLACE THE IMPORTANCE OF ENACTMENT IN PERSPECTIVE
The sponsoring organizations also need to change their atti-
tude about the importance of the enactment of proposed uniform
laws as the measure of their success. The history of the Code
clearly reveals that the need to gain the support of powerful in-
terest groups that otherwise might block enactment of a uniform
law makes the uniform laws process vulnerable to the influence
of these groups at the drafting stage. Further, at the enactment
stage, the desire to have uniform laws passed quickly and with-
out amendment works against allowing legislatures to give
them independent, informed consideration.
Thus, at the drafting stage, the drafters of uniform laws
need to be particularly concerned that the need to satisfy busi-
ness interests with the political power to block a uniform law at
the enactment stage does not become the driving force behind
the substance of uniform laws. "Consensus" should not be ob-
tained by cutting out the interests of those with opposing views
but less political clout. In addition, as discussed above, at the
enactment stage, the sponsoring organizations need to be will-
ing to allow the legislatures to determine the merits of the policy
choices represented by the uniform legislation for themselves-
and, in fact, need to assist them in their ability to do so-even if
this creates a greater likelihood that the uniform law will be
amended, or not enacted at all.
If the Code drafters are successful in making the drafting
process truly representative of all interests, perhaps consensus
will be reached by all affected parties at the drafting stage, and
enactment will not present a problem. The resulting legislation
will represent policy choices satisfactory to all interests and
thus, presumably, satisfactory to even the most informed state
legislature. In addition, to the extent sponsors of uniform legis-
lation are successful in educating the state legislatures about
the merits of uniform laws, they may be less dependent upon the
support of special interest groups for enactment.
Nevertheless, if true consensus cannot be reached, the Con-
ference should either abandon the project, or in an appropriate
situation, draft the law that it considers to represent the better
position, even though adopting that position may cause a politi-
cally influential group to oppose the law in the state legisla-
tures. As the Conference itself has recognized, uniform laws can
have value apart from their "enactability," through their influ-
ence on other state legislation that is enacted, as well as through
1993]
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their impact on case law and teaching practices. 28 5
D. CHOOSE THE APPROPRIATE LEGISLATIVE FORUM
Given the position that the uniform laws process occupies
within our federal structure, the sponsoring organizations need
to consider when deciding whether to draft a uniform law
whether the subject matter of the proposed law is one better
dealt with by state rather than federal legislation. 2 6 The ra-
tionale for using the uniform laws process rather than allowing
uniformity to occur through federal legislation should be explic-
itly articulated as part of the decision to undertake a drafting
project. A vague reference to states rights is an insufficient jus-
tification-the states never were intended to be the source of
law on all subjects. The fact that the area has been addressed
through a uniform law in the past should not, of itself, be suffi-
cient either. The changed conditions that have led the sponsor-
ing organizations to conclude that the uniform law must be
revised may also indicate in a given situation that such revision
should occur through federal legislation. 28 7 Moreover, given the
broadened scope of conflict available at the federal level, the
Conference must consider whether the uniform laws process is
going to provide an adequate forum for all affected interests to
285. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 18, at 109-10; 1988 Criteria, supra note 21,
§ 2(c). The 1988 Criteria state that, "[aicts may promote uniformity indirectly
as well as by substantially verbatim adoptions," for instance, by "extensive
adoptions in principle," through "impact on case law and teaching practices,"
and by "gradually increasing adoptions, either in statutes or in case law, of
particular sections or parts of a Uniform or Model Act addressing specific
problems within the larger area to which the act is directed." 1988 Criteria,
supra note 21, § 2(c).
286. In 1965, Allison Dunham, coreporter for Article 9 and first Executive
Director of the Conference, pointed out that:
As the limiting effect of the federal constitution on congressional power
has steadily declined through judicial interpretation... the work of
the Conference, particularly as reflected in the reports of the president,
does not indicate any major attempt to work out a theory as to when
uniformity of law should be obtained by voluntary action [through the
uniform laws process] and when it should be obtained by direction
[through federal legislation].
Dunham, supra note 12, at 237. The Conference apparently still has not made
any major attempt to do so.
287. For an example of the kinds of considerations that should go into the
Conference's analysis of the appropriate legislative forum, see Goldstein, supra
note 264 (concluding that wholesale wire transfers would be more effectively
regulated at the federal rather than the state level). See also Rubin, supra note
105, at 1265-73 (discussing need for a regulatory scheme with administrative
agency rulemaking and enforcement as a driving force behind the choice of fed-
eral over state legislation).
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present their views and reach consensus about the substance of
the law. If the answer to this question is "no," then the project
should not be undertaken.
The sponsoring organizations also may want to consider
whether they have taken too narrow a view of their role. It has
been suggested from time to time that the Conference should
draft uniform laws for enactment at the federal level as well as
laws for enactment by the states. Indeed, the Code itself was
originally planned as legislation that could be enacted at either
the state or the federal level.28 8 The Conference, however, has
rejected these suggestions on the grounds that drafting laws for
federal enactment would go beyond its statutory mandate and
be inconsistent with its emphasis on preserving state auton-
omy.289 It may be time to reconsider this position. State inter-
ests are represented in our federal system in numerous ways
other than through the passage of state legislation. 290 In fact,
several commentators-including Karl Llewellyn-have argued
that adoption at the federal level of a law that has been devel-
oped with input from the Conference is an accommodation of
state interests rather than an invasion of state sovereignty.2 91
Certainly, to the extent that the Conference views itself as rep-
resentative of the views of the states, this seems a logical conclu-
sion. To the extent that the Conference views itself primarily as
a mechanism for providing quality drafting of uniform laws, it
seems that the expertise of the Conference's drafters would be
just as beneficial at the federal as at the state level. In any
event, whether the Conference chooses to view itself as limited
to promulgating laws for state adoption or not, it seems clear
that an organization devoted to uniformity of law cannot afford
288. Schnader, supra note 240, at 231.
289. Dunham, supra note 12, at 237-38.
290. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 44, at 364-66 (discussing ways in which
federal commercial code might be structured to take into account state inter-
ests); ROBERT P. STOKER, RELUCTANT PARTNERS: IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL POLICY
10-11 (1991) (explaining ways in which state interests are represented in the
implementation of federal policy).
291. E.g., Llewellyn, supra note 50, at 561 (arguing that adoption of a fed-
eral sales bill would be "No trespass on States' Rights, but rather builds... on
State experience [and] capitalizes [on] the States' initiative" in the Uniform
Sales Act); Horack, supra note 273, at 564. Horack argues:
It is clear that the Code presents the best thinking of the Commission-
ers of the several states; if Congress adopts their proposal it is much
more logical to say that Congress is following the wishes and the lead




to ignore the possibility that uniformity may best be furthered
through federal rather than state legislation. Given the impact
of the uniform laws process on the dynamics of federalism, it
would seem irresponsible for the Conference to do so.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws celebrated its one-hundredth anniversary in 1992.
If it is to continue to have a significant impact on the develop-
ment of commercial law in its second century, then it needs to
offer not only the group of intelligent and dedicated experts that
always have been associated with the Code effort, but also a pro-
cess for the creation and enactment of commercial law designed
for the present and the future, rather than the past.
Consideration of the uniform laws process in light of mod-
em group theory demonstrates that, as currently structured, the
process is an inadequate mechanism for drafting commercial
legislation designed to reach reasonable accommodation among
the interests of all affected groups. Grounded in outmoded no-
tions of group dynamics and the workings of federalism, the cur-
rent uniform laws process, rather than providing a means for
drafting laws that represent neutral, best solutions to commer-
cial law issues, tends instead to produce only solutions that are
the most amenable to the business special interests that largely
dominate it.
The uniform laws process, at both its drafting and its enact-
ment stage, exacerbates the inherent organizational disadvan-
tages under which consumer interests operate. At the drafting
stage, its lack of visibility and accessibility to the general public,
combined with the absence of any formal structure for obtaining
input from all affected groups, means that consumer interests
are not likely to receive effective representation. At the enact-
ment stage, the pressures associated with the drive for uniform-
ity in the fifty states discourage independent consideration by
the state legislatures of the drafters' policy choices; these pres-
sures thus may deprive the states of the opportunity to make
truly informed and autonomous decisions about the appropriate-
ness of those policy choices, and rob the policy choices them-
selves of the legitimacy that the approval of a democratically
elected, politically accountable body otherwise might give them.
At the same time, the Conference's largely uncritical acceptance
of a states' rights rationale for utilizing the uniform laws process
with regard to every issue ignores the considerable impact that
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process has on the dynamics of federalism, and consequently, on
the development of policy at the appropriate representative
level.
It is not surprising that a process developed one hundred
years ago needs revision. Moreover, revision of the uniform laws
process at this point would not be the first time the process has
been altered to reflect changing conceptions of decision-making
processes. When the Conference was founded in 1892, formal-
ism still was the dominant legal paradigm. 292 In a jurispruden-
tial structure in which legal principles had an independent
existence, and thus correct solutions were waiting to be "found"
through a process of deductive reasoning, employing a group of
experts to find them made good sense.
By the time the Code project came along, however, the Real-
ist movement had largely undermined formalism. Deductive
reasoning did not "find" right answers; rather, it merely pro-
vided solutions based on the initial premises chosen by the rea-
soner-the important thing was how one picked the premises.
Llewellyn believed that these premises could be discovered in
the patterns of commercial practice,293 and he altered the uni-
form laws process accordingly to reflect this belief by involving
in it those business interests in whose collective practices he
thought the appropriate rules of commercial law lay waiting to
be found.2 94
292. White, supra note 35, at 2098 ("Originally the Commissioners held the
naive assumption that the law could be 'found' and stated.").
293. Danzig, supra note 8, at 624-26. Llewellyn viewed law neither as a
body of deduced rules nor "as an instrument chosen by social planners from
among a universe of alternatives," but as "an articulation and regularization of
unconsciously evolved mores," mores that could be discovered in the patterns of
current commercial practice. Id.
294. Professor Danzig notes:
This view has strikingly negative implications for an active legislative
role. If law exists and needs only to be discovered, it is not necessary
or helpful (but indeed probably only burdensome) that the law-articu-
lating agency be democratically elected and politically responsive; to
proceed effectively, a lawmaker needs only a capacity for detecting the
"situation sense" and a good faith commitment to exercise that
capacity.
Id. at 625. According to Danzig, this explains Llewellyn's choice of the courts,
rather than the legislatures, as the primary agencies for the development of
specific legal rules in Article 2. Id. See also supra note 72. It may also explain
why Llewellyn was comfortable with the uniform laws process as a method for
enacting commercial legislation, once the process was altered to provide the
drafters with the technical information they needed about commercial transac-
tions through the inclusion of representatives of the business interests whose
transactions were to be covered by the Code. Just as the courts could ascertain
the relevant commercial practices necessary to their decision in specific factual
1993]
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Modern jurisprudential concepts, however, have moved be-
yond the notion that the development of law involves the discov-
ery of preexisting legal principles, whether found in the abstract
through deductive reasoning or in the concrete through ascer-
tainment of commercial practices. Rather, "[w]e have learned to
view legal rules, particularly in the commercial area, as an in-
strument of social policy rather than an autonomous body of doc-
trine reflecting general and apolitical principles of law."2 95
Legal rules represent choices from among a number of alterna-
tives-choices that involve policy decisions to value some inter-
ests more than others. When presented with a law that
purports to represent the "best" solution to a given problem, the
natural question to be asked is, "Best for whom?"
Modern theories of decision making are the standards by
which the uniform laws process will and should be judged, and
under those standards it does not, as currently structured, make
the grade. It seems the Conference is faced with a choice: it
must either alter its process to make it truly representative, or
abandon its assertion that the commercial laws it drafts are the
"best" solutions for the problems with which they deal. If it does
nothing, it runs the risk not only of tarnishing its reputation as
a neutral body of experts, but also of becoming a marginal player
in the future development of the commercial law.
situations from the evidence presented at trial, the drafters could ascertain the
relevant rules to include in the commercial code to guide the courts' decisions
from the information about commercial operations provided by business
interests.
295. Rubin, supra note 5, at 560.
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